The Functional Unity of Special Science Kinds
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 8398446 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Daniel A Weiskopf (0000-0002-2788-2280, Georgia State University, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2011 |
| Volume | 62 |
| Issue | 2 |
| Pages | 233-258 |
| Publication date | 2011-06-01 |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0007-0882 • E-ISSN: 1464-3537 |
| Publisher | Oxford University Press (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1093/bjps/axq026 |
| OpenAlex | W2147199771 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 17 |
| References cited | 39 |
The view that special science properties are multiply realizable has been attacked in recent years by Shapiro, Bechtel and Mundale, Polger, and others. Focusing on psychological and neuroscientific properties, I argue that these attacks are unsuccessful. By drawing on interspecies physiological comparisons I show that diverse physical mechanisms can converge on common functional properties at multiple levels. This is illustrated with examples from the psychophysics and neuroscience of early vision. This convergence is compatible with the existence of general constraints on the evolution of cognitive systems, and does not involve any ad hoc typing of coarse-grained higher level properties. The mechanisms that realize these common higher level properties are really distinct by the criteria laid down by critics of multiple realizability. Finally, I present an account of how such functional properties might constitute special science kinds by playing a central explanatory role in a range of cognitive models. Behavioral science kinds in particular are the functionally defined constituents picked out by our most successful models of the multilevel systems and mechanisms that explain cognitive capacities. 1 Reduction Versus Elimination, Redux 2 The Eyes of Others 3 Unity Through Constraint? 4 Justifying Taxonomic Mismatches 5 Further Conditions on Multiple Realization 6 Explanatory Taxonomy and the Special Sciences 7 Conclusions
Cognition · Cognitive psychology · Cognitive science · Constraint (computer-aided design) · Epistemology · Range (aeronautics) · Artificial Intelligence · Computer Science · Mathematics · Neural dynamics and brain function · Neuroscience · Philosophy · Philosophy and History of Science · Plant and Biological Electrophysiology Studies · Psychology
Neurocognitive Mechanisms
Dual process theory and the challenges of functional individuation
“Philosophers care about the truth”
Mechanisms in psychology
Cognitive archaeology without behavioral modernity
Historical Kinds in the Social World
Making mechanism interesting
Functional kinds
Neural correlates without reduction
Empiricism without magic
Minimal models and canonical neural computations
Models and mechanisms in psychological explanation
Explanations in cognitive science
Mental kinematics
Natural diversity
Multiple Realizability and Biological Modality
Rescuing Ontological Individualism
Explaining the Brain
Mechanisms and natural kinds
Multiple Realizations
Historical Kinds and the “Special Sciences”
Realism, anti-foundationalism and the enthusiasm for natural kinds
Modeling mechanisms
When mechanistic models explain
Evaluating the evidence for multiple realization
Shocking Lessons from Electric Fish
How to Test for Multiple Realization
Multiple Realizability Revisited
The Mind as Neural Software? Understanding Functionalism, Computationalism, and Computational Functionalism
Multiple Realization and the Metaphysics of Reduction
Fundamentally misunderstanding visual perception
| Citations per year | 1.13 |
|---|---|
| Citation span | 2011 - 2024 (14) |
| Highly cited | No |