Pragmatic Truth and the Logic of Induction
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 8399307 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Newton C A Da Costa (0000-0001-7723-2676, Universidade de São Paulo), Steven French (Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP)) |
| Year | 1989 |
| Volume | 40 |
| Issue | 3 |
| Pages | 333-356 |
| Publication date | 1989-09-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0007-0882 • E-ISSN: 1464-3537 |
| Publisher | Oxford University Press (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1093/bjps/40.3.333 |
| OpenAlex | W1964787627 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 15 |
| References cited | 15 |
We apply the recently elaborated notions of ‘pragmatic truth’ and ‘pragmatic probability’ to the problem of the construction of a logic of inductive inference. It is argued that the system outlined here is able to overcome many of the objections usually levelled against such attempts. We claim, furthermore, that our view captures the essentially cumulative nature of science and allows us to explain why it is indeed reasonable to accept and believe in the conclusions reached by inductive inference.
Epistemology · Inductive reasoning · Inference · Rule of inference · Artificial Intelligence · Biomedical Text Mining and Ontologies · Computer Science · Philosophy · Philosophy and History of Science · Semantic Web and Ontologies
Verdade pragmática
Science and Partial Truth
Reinflating the semantic approach
The Reasonable Effectiveness of Mathematics
Quasi-Truth In Quasi-Set Theory
Partial Structures and Jeffrey-Keynes Algebras
On Russell's principle of induction
Two types of empirical adequacy
Quasi-truth, paraconsistency, and the foundations of science
Can the constructive empiricist be a nominalist? Quasi-truth, commitment and consistency
Empiricism, scientific change and mathematical change
Empirical adequacy
The Model-Theoretic Approach in the Philosophy of Science
Empiricism, Conservativeness, and Quasi-Truth
Problems with the Deductivist Image of Scientific Reasoning
The Structure of Scientific Inference
Pragmatic truth and approximation to truth
Correspondence, invariance and heuristics
The Model-Theoretic Approach in the Philosophy of Science
Slightly More Realistic Personal Probability
Induction, Probability, and Confirmation
Probability and Induction
Some Recent Objections to the Bayesian Theory of Support
Bayesianism and the Rationality of Scientific Inference 1
The Problem of Induction
| Unique citing works | 15 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0,42 |
| Citation span | 1990 - 2013 (24) |
| Citation velocity | historical |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 14 |