Predictive Minds Can Be Humean Minds
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 8399566 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Frederik Tollerup Junker (0000-0001-9785-6793, corresponding author), Jelle Bruineberg (0000-0001-5675-3376), Thor Grünbaum (0000-0002-6464-8098) |
| Year | 2024 |
| Publication date | 2024-10-03 |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0007-0882 • E-ISSN: 1464-3537 |
| Publisher | University of Chicago Press (PUBLISHER • US) |
| DOI | 10.1086/733413 |
| OpenAlex | W4403096517 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 2 |
| References cited | 43 |
The predictive processing literature contains at least two different versions of the framework with different theoretical resources at their disposal. One version appeals to so-called optimistic priors to explain agents’ motivation to act (call this optimistic predictive processing). A more recent version appeals to expected free energy minimization to explain how agents can decide between different action policies (call this preference predictive processing). The difference between the two versions has not been properly appreciated, and they are not sufficiently separated in the literature. They constitute two different theories with strikingly different accounts of motivation and action. By reducing all desire-like constructs to belief-like constructs, optimistic predictive processing entails a substantial revision of standard accounts of motivation and action in philosophy and cognitive science. By contrast, preference predictive processing introduces desire-like constructs that play Humean motivational roles in the explanation of action. In this Humean iteration, predictive processing resembles other prominent computational frameworks implementing a distinction between beliefs and desires, such as reinforcement learning and Bayesian decision theory. Ultimately, predictive processing faces a dilemma between parsimony of mental constructs and completeness of its explanations of agency and the mind
Cognitive science · Epistemology · Philosophy of science · Action Observation and Synchronization · Embodied and Extended Cognition · Philosophy · Philosophy and History of Science · Psychology
Surfing Uncertainty
Three Faces of Desire
The free-energy principle
Active Inference, homeostatic regulation and adaptive behavioural control
Active inference and epistemic value
Predictions not commands
Active Inference
Whatever next? Predictive brains, situated agents, and the future of cognitive science
The free-energy principle
The Humean Theory of Motivation
Is the brain an organ for free energy minimisation
Attention in the predictive mind
Predictions, precision, and agentive attention
A predictive processing theory of motivation
Active inference models do not contradict folk psychology
The anticipating brain is not a scientist
What do predictive coders want
Intention, Plans, and Practical Reason
Predictive Minds Can Be Humean Minds
Actions, Reasons, and Causes
Intentionality
| Citations per year | 1 |
|---|---|
| Citation span | 2024 - 2026 (3) |
| Highly cited | No |