Comparative Bayesian Confirmation and the Quine–Duhem Problem
A Rejoinder to Strevens
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 8399634 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Branden Fitelson (0000-0002-8847-220X, University of California, Berkeley), Andrew Waterman (Film Independent) |
| Year | 2007 |
| Volume | 58 |
| Issue | 2 |
| Pages | 333-338 |
| Publication date | 2007-06-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0007-0882 • E-ISSN: 1464-3537 |
| Publisher | Oxford University Press (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1093/bjps/axm012 |
| OpenAlex | W2157600336 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 5 |
| References cited | 4 |
By and large, we think (Strevens's [2005]) is a useful reply to our original critique (Fitelson and Waterman [2005]) of his article on the Quine–Duhem (QD) problem (Strevens [2001]). But, we remain unsatisfied with several aspects of his reply (and his original article). Ultimately, we do not think he properly addresses our most important worries. In this brief rejoinder, we explain our remaining worries, and we issue a revised challenge for Strevens's approach to QD. 1. Strevens's ‘clarifications’2. Strevens's new-and-improved ‘negligibility arguments’
Bayesian probability · Epistemology · Quine · Artificial Intelligence · Bayesian Modeling and Causal Inference · Computer Science · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Philosophy · Philosophy and History of Science
| Unique citing works | 5 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0,31 |
| Citation span | 2010 - 2023 (14) |
| Citation velocity | historical |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 5 |