Branden Fitelson
Biographic Data
| ID | 970467 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Branden Fitelson |
| GIVEN NAMES | Branden |
| FAMILY NAME | Fitelson |
| SIGNATURE | FITELSON B |
| AFFILIATIONS | University of California, Berkeley |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-8847-220X |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 24 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 176 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 24 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 1996 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2024 |
| H-INDEX | 7 |
Accuracy-First Epistemology and Scientific Progress
The accuracy-first program attempts to ground epistemology in the norm that one’s beliefs should be as accurate as possible, where accuracy is measured using a scoring rule. We argue that considerations of scientific progress suggest that such a monism about epistemic value is untenable. In particular, we argue that counterexamples to the standard scoring rules are ubiquitous in the history of science, and hence that these scoring rules cannot be…
Remarks on staffel on full belief
Four Approaches to Supposition
Suppositions can be introduced in either the indicative or subjunctive mood. There are also two types of judgments that may be initiated by suppositions of either sort: qualitative (binary) judgments and quantitative (numerical) ones. The former are judgments about whether a given proposition is acceptable and the latter are about how acceptable it is. We systematically explicate the relationships between canonical representatives of each of the …
Deference Done Better
There are many things—call them ‘experts'—that you should defer to in forming your opinions. The trouble is, many experts are modest : they're less than certain that they are worthy of deference. When this happens, the standard theories of deference break down: the most popular (“Reflection”‐style) principles collapse to inconsistency, while their most popular (“New‐Reflection”‐style) variants allow you to defer to someone while regarding them as…
A Problem for Confirmation Measure Z
In this article, I present a serious problem for confirmation measure Z
Declarations of independence
A New Garber-Style Solution to the Problem of Old Evidence
In this discussion note, we explain how to relax some of the standard assumptions made in Garber-style solutions to the Problem of Old Evidence. The result is a more general and explanatory Bayesian approach
Introduction to the Special Issue: Probability, Confirmation and Fallacies
Accuracy, Language Dependence, and Joyce's Argument for Probabilism
In this article, I explain how a variant of David Miller's argument concerning the language dependence of the accuracy of predictions can be applied to Joyce's notion of the accuracy of “estimates of numerical truth-values” (i.e., Joycean credences). This leads to a potential problem for Joyce's accuracy-dominance-based argument for the conclusion that credences (understood as “estimates of numerical truth-values” in Joyce's sense) should obey th…
Favoring, Likelihoodism, and Bayesianism
The Wason Task(s) and the Paradox of Confirmation: The Wason Task(s) and The Paradox of Confirmation
The (recent, Bayesian) cognitive science literature on the Wason Task (WT) has been modeled largely after the (not-so-recent, Bayesian) philosophy of science literature on the Paradox of Confirmation (POC). In this paper, we apply some insights from more recent Bayesian approaches to the (POC) to analogous models of (WT). This involves, first, retracing the history of the (POC), and, then, re-examining the (WT) with these historico-philosophical …
Teaching & Learning Guide for: The Paradox of Confirmation
Author's Introduction The early twentieth century witnessed a shift in the way philosophers of science thought about traditional ‘problems of induction’. Keynes championed the idea that Hume's Problem was not a problem about causation (which had been the traditional reading of Hume) but rather a problem about induction . Moreover, Keynes (and later Nicod) viewed such problems as having both logical and epistemological components. Hempel picked up…
Likelihoodism, Bayesianism, and relational confirmation
Comparative Bayesian Confirmation and the Quine–Duhem Problem: A Rejoinder to Strevens
By and large, we think (Strevens's [2005]) is a useful reply to our original critique (Fitelson and Waterman [2005]) of his article on the Quine–Duhem (QD) problem (Strevens [2001]). But, we remain unsatisfied with several aspects of his reply (and his original article). Ultimately, we do not think he properly addresses our most important worries. In this brief rejoinder, we explain our remaining worries, and we issue a revised challenge for Stre…
Logical Foundations of Evidential Support
Carnap's inductive logic (or confirmation) project is revisited from an “increase in firmness” (or probabilistic relevance) point of view. It is argued that Carnap's main desiderata can be satisfied in this setting, without the need for a theory of “logical probability.” The emphasis here will be on explaining how Carnap's epistemological desiderata for inductive logic will need to be modified in this new setting. The key move is to abandon Carna…
The Paradox of Confirmation1
Hempel first introduced the paradox of confirmation in 1937. Since then, a very extensive literature on the paradox has evolved ( Vranas 2004 ). Much of this literature can be seen as responding to Hempel's subsequent discussions and analyses of the paradox ( Hempel 1945 ). Recently, it was noted that Hempel's intuitive (and plausible) resolution of the paradox was inconsistent with his official theory of confirmation ( Fitelson and Hawthorne 200…
Bayesian Confirmation and Auxiliary Hypotheses Revisited: A Reply to Strevens
Michael Strevens ([2001]) has proposed an interesting and novel Bayesian analysis of the Quine-Duhem (Q–D) problem (i.e., the problem of auxiliary hypotheses). Strevens's analysis involves the use of a simplifying idealization concerning the original Q–D problem. We will show that this idealization is far stronger than it might appear. Indeed, we argue that Strevens's idealization oversimplifies the Q–D problem, and we propose a diagnosis of the …
Too Odd (Not) to Be True? A Reply to Olsson
In ‘Corroborating Testimony, Probability and Surprise’, Erik J. Olsson ascribes to L. Jonathan Cohen the claims that if two witnesses provide us with the same information, then the less probable the information is, the more confident we may be that the information is true (C), and the stronger the information is corroborated (C*). We question whether Cohen intends anything like claims (C) and (C*). Furthermore, he discusses the concurrence of wit…
Putting the Irrelevance Back Into the Problem of Irrelevant Conjunction
Naive deductive accounts of confirmation have the undesirable consequence that if E confirms H, then E also confirms the conjunction H & X, for any X —even if X is utterly irrelevant to H (and E ). Bayesian accounts of confirmation also have this property (in the case of deductive evidence). Several Bayesians have attempted to soften the impact of this fact by arguing that—according to Bayesian accounts of confirmation— E will confirm the conjunc…
A Bayesian Account of Independent Evidence with Applications
A Bayesian account of independent evidential support is outlined. This account is partly inspired by the work of C. S. Peirce. I show that a large class of quantitative Bayesian measures of confirmation satisfy some basic desiderata suggested by Peirce for adequate accounts of independent evidence. I argue that, by considering further natural constraints on a probabilistic account of independent evidence, all but a very small class of Bayesian me…
How Not to Detect Design—Critical Notice: William A. Dembski, The Design Inference
An abstract is not available for this content so a preview has been provided. Please use the Get access link above for information on how to access this content
Models and Reality-A Review of Brian Skyrms's Evolution of the Social Contract
The Plurality of Bayesian Measures of Confirmation and the Problem of Measure Sensitivity
Contemporary Bayesian confirmation theorists measure degree of (incremental) confirmation using a variety of non-equivalent relevance measures. As a result, a great many of the arguments surrounding quantitative Bayesian confirmation theory are implicitly sensitive to choice of measure of confirmation. Such arguments are enthymematic , since they tacitly presuppose that certain relevance measures should be used (for various purposes) rather than …
Wayne, Horwich, and Evidential Diversity
In a recent article, Wayne (1995) offers a critique of Horwich's (1982) Bayesian explication of the confirmational significance of evidential diversity. Presently, I argue that Wayne's reconstruction of Horwich's account is not faithful to Horwich's original presentation. Because Wayne's reconstruction is uncharitable, his criticisms turn out to be off the mark. I try to provide a more faithful and charitable rendition of Horwich's account. Unfor…
The Plurality of Bayesian Measures of Confirmation and the Problem of Measure Sensitivity
Contemporary Bayesian confirmation theorists measure degree of (incremental) confirmation using a variety of non-equivalent relevance measures. As a result, a great many of the arguments surrounding quantitative Bayesian confirmation theory are implicitly sensitive to choice of measure of confirmation. Such arguments are enthymematic , since they tacitly presuppose that certain relevance measures should be used (for various purposes) rather than …
A Bayesian Account of Independent Evidence with Applications
A Bayesian account of independent evidential support is outlined. This account is partly inspired by the work of C. S. Peirce. I show that a large class of quantitative Bayesian measures of confirmation satisfy some basic desiderata suggested by Peirce for adequate accounts of independent evidence. I argue that, by considering further natural constraints on a probabilistic account of independent evidence, all but a very small class of Bayesian me…
Likelihoodism, Bayesianism, and relational confirmation
Putting the Irrelevance Back Into the Problem of Irrelevant Conjunction
Naive deductive accounts of confirmation have the undesirable consequence that if E confirms H, then E also confirms the conjunction H & X, for any X —even if X is utterly irrelevant to H (and E ). Bayesian accounts of confirmation also have this property (in the case of deductive evidence). Several Bayesians have attempted to soften the impact of this fact by arguing that—according to Bayesian accounts of confirmation— E will confirm the conjunc…
Logical Foundations of Evidential Support
Carnap's inductive logic (or confirmation) project is revisited from an “increase in firmness” (or probabilistic relevance) point of view. It is argued that Carnap's main desiderata can be satisfied in this setting, without the need for a theory of “logical probability.” The emphasis here will be on explaining how Carnap's epistemological desiderata for inductive logic will need to be modified in this new setting. The key move is to abandon Carna…
Bayesian Confirmation and Auxiliary Hypotheses Revisited: A Reply to Strevens
Michael Strevens ([2001]) has proposed an interesting and novel Bayesian analysis of the Quine-Duhem (Q–D) problem (i.e., the problem of auxiliary hypotheses). Strevens's analysis involves the use of a simplifying idealization concerning the original Q–D problem. We will show that this idealization is far stronger than it might appear. Indeed, we argue that Strevens's idealization oversimplifies the Q–D problem, and we propose a diagnosis of the …
Too Odd (Not) to Be True? A Reply to Olsson
In ‘Corroborating Testimony, Probability and Surprise’, Erik J. Olsson ascribes to L. Jonathan Cohen the claims that if two witnesses provide us with the same information, then the less probable the information is, the more confident we may be that the information is true (C), and the stronger the information is corroborated (C*). We question whether Cohen intends anything like claims (C) and (C*). Furthermore, he discusses the concurrence of wit…
Declarations of independence
Wayne, Horwich, and Evidential Diversity
In a recent article, Wayne (1995) offers a critique of Horwich's (1982) Bayesian explication of the confirmational significance of evidential diversity. Presently, I argue that Wayne's reconstruction of Horwich's account is not faithful to Horwich's original presentation. Because Wayne's reconstruction is uncharitable, his criticisms turn out to be off the mark. I try to provide a more faithful and charitable rendition of Horwich's account. Unfor…
Deference Done Better
There are many things—call them ‘experts'—that you should defer to in forming your opinions. The trouble is, many experts are modest : they're less than certain that they are worthy of deference. When this happens, the standard theories of deference break down: the most popular (“Reflection”‐style) principles collapse to inconsistency, while their most popular (“New‐Reflection”‐style) variants allow you to defer to someone while regarding them as…
A New Garber-Style Solution to the Problem of Old Evidence
In this discussion note, we explain how to relax some of the standard assumptions made in Garber-style solutions to the Problem of Old Evidence. The result is a more general and explanatory Bayesian approach
The Wason Task(s) and the Paradox of Confirmation: The Wason Task(s) and The Paradox of Confirmation
The (recent, Bayesian) cognitive science literature on the Wason Task (WT) has been modeled largely after the (not-so-recent, Bayesian) philosophy of science literature on the Paradox of Confirmation (POC). In this paper, we apply some insights from more recent Bayesian approaches to the (POC) to analogous models of (WT). This involves, first, retracing the history of the (POC), and, then, re-examining the (WT) with these historico-philosophical …
Comparative Bayesian Confirmation and the Quine–Duhem Problem: A Rejoinder to Strevens
By and large, we think (Strevens's [2005]) is a useful reply to our original critique (Fitelson and Waterman [2005]) of his article on the Quine–Duhem (QD) problem (Strevens [2001]). But, we remain unsatisfied with several aspects of his reply (and his original article). Ultimately, we do not think he properly addresses our most important worries. In this brief rejoinder, we explain our remaining worries, and we issue a revised challenge for Stre…
The Paradox of Confirmation1
Hempel first introduced the paradox of confirmation in 1937. Since then, a very extensive literature on the paradox has evolved ( Vranas 2004 ). Much of this literature can be seen as responding to Hempel's subsequent discussions and analyses of the paradox ( Hempel 1945 ). Recently, it was noted that Hempel's intuitive (and plausible) resolution of the paradox was inconsistent with his official theory of confirmation ( Fitelson and Hawthorne 200…
Accuracy, Language Dependence, and Joyce's Argument for Probabilism
In this article, I explain how a variant of David Miller's argument concerning the language dependence of the accuracy of predictions can be applied to Joyce's notion of the accuracy of “estimates of numerical truth-values” (i.e., Joycean credences). This leads to a potential problem for Joyce's accuracy-dominance-based argument for the conclusion that credences (understood as “estimates of numerical truth-values” in Joyce's sense) should obey th…
Favoring, Likelihoodism, and Bayesianism
Models and Reality-A Review of Brian Skyrms's Evolution of the Social Contract
Wayne, Horwich, and Evidential Diversity
In a recent article, Wayne (1995) offers a critique of Horwich's (1982) Bayesian explication of the confirmational significance of evidential diversity. Presently, I argue that Wayne's reconstruction of Horwich's account is not faithful to Horwich's original presentation. Because Wayne's reconstruction is uncharitable, his criticisms turn out to be off the mark. I try to provide a more faithful and charitable rendition of Horwich's account. Unfor…
How Not to Detect Design—Critical Notice: William A. Dembski, The Design Inference
An abstract is not available for this content so a preview has been provided. Please use the Get access link above for information on how to access this content
Models and Reality-A Review of Brian Skyrms's Evolution of the Social Contract
The Plurality of Bayesian Measures of Confirmation and the Problem of Measure Sensitivity
Contemporary Bayesian confirmation theorists measure degree of (incremental) confirmation using a variety of non-equivalent relevance measures. As a result, a great many of the arguments surrounding quantitative Bayesian confirmation theory are implicitly sensitive to choice of measure of confirmation. Such arguments are enthymematic , since they tacitly presuppose that certain relevance measures should be used (for various purposes) rather than …
A Bayesian Account of Independent Evidence with Applications
A Bayesian account of independent evidential support is outlined. This account is partly inspired by the work of C. S. Peirce. I show that a large class of quantitative Bayesian measures of confirmation satisfy some basic desiderata suggested by Peirce for adequate accounts of independent evidence. I argue that, by considering further natural constraints on a probabilistic account of independent evidence, all but a very small class of Bayesian me…
Too Odd (Not) to Be True? A Reply to Olsson
In ‘Corroborating Testimony, Probability and Surprise’, Erik J. Olsson ascribes to L. Jonathan Cohen the claims that if two witnesses provide us with the same information, then the less probable the information is, the more confident we may be that the information is true (C), and the stronger the information is corroborated (C*). We question whether Cohen intends anything like claims (C) and (C*). Furthermore, he discusses the concurrence of wit…
Putting the Irrelevance Back Into the Problem of Irrelevant Conjunction
Naive deductive accounts of confirmation have the undesirable consequence that if E confirms H, then E also confirms the conjunction H & X, for any X —even if X is utterly irrelevant to H (and E ). Bayesian accounts of confirmation also have this property (in the case of deductive evidence). Several Bayesians have attempted to soften the impact of this fact by arguing that—according to Bayesian accounts of confirmation— E will confirm the conjunc…
Bayesian Confirmation and Auxiliary Hypotheses Revisited: A Reply to Strevens
Michael Strevens ([2001]) has proposed an interesting and novel Bayesian analysis of the Quine-Duhem (Q–D) problem (i.e., the problem of auxiliary hypotheses). Strevens's analysis involves the use of a simplifying idealization concerning the original Q–D problem. We will show that this idealization is far stronger than it might appear. Indeed, we argue that Strevens's idealization oversimplifies the Q–D problem, and we propose a diagnosis of the …
Logical Foundations of Evidential Support
Carnap's inductive logic (or confirmation) project is revisited from an “increase in firmness” (or probabilistic relevance) point of view. It is argued that Carnap's main desiderata can be satisfied in this setting, without the need for a theory of “logical probability.” The emphasis here will be on explaining how Carnap's epistemological desiderata for inductive logic will need to be modified in this new setting. The key move is to abandon Carna…
The Paradox of Confirmation1
Hempel first introduced the paradox of confirmation in 1937. Since then, a very extensive literature on the paradox has evolved ( Vranas 2004 ). Much of this literature can be seen as responding to Hempel's subsequent discussions and analyses of the paradox ( Hempel 1945 ). Recently, it was noted that Hempel's intuitive (and plausible) resolution of the paradox was inconsistent with his official theory of confirmation ( Fitelson and Hawthorne 200…
Likelihoodism, Bayesianism, and relational confirmation
Comparative Bayesian Confirmation and the Quine–Duhem Problem: A Rejoinder to Strevens
By and large, we think (Strevens's [2005]) is a useful reply to our original critique (Fitelson and Waterman [2005]) of his article on the Quine–Duhem (QD) problem (Strevens [2001]). But, we remain unsatisfied with several aspects of his reply (and his original article). Ultimately, we do not think he properly addresses our most important worries. In this brief rejoinder, we explain our remaining worries, and we issue a revised challenge for Stre…
Teaching & Learning Guide for: The Paradox of Confirmation
Author's Introduction The early twentieth century witnessed a shift in the way philosophers of science thought about traditional ‘problems of induction’. Keynes championed the idea that Hume's Problem was not a problem about causation (which had been the traditional reading of Hume) but rather a problem about induction . Moreover, Keynes (and later Nicod) viewed such problems as having both logical and epistemological components. Hempel picked up…
The Wason Task(s) and the Paradox of Confirmation: The Wason Task(s) and The Paradox of Confirmation
The (recent, Bayesian) cognitive science literature on the Wason Task (WT) has been modeled largely after the (not-so-recent, Bayesian) philosophy of science literature on the Paradox of Confirmation (POC). In this paper, we apply some insights from more recent Bayesian approaches to the (POC) to analogous models of (WT). This involves, first, retracing the history of the (POC), and, then, re-examining the (WT) with these historico-philosophical …
Favoring, Likelihoodism, and Bayesianism
Introduction to the Special Issue: Probability, Confirmation and Fallacies
Accuracy, Language Dependence, and Joyce's Argument for Probabilism
In this article, I explain how a variant of David Miller's argument concerning the language dependence of the accuracy of predictions can be applied to Joyce's notion of the accuracy of “estimates of numerical truth-values” (i.e., Joycean credences). This leads to a potential problem for Joyce's accuracy-dominance-based argument for the conclusion that credences (understood as “estimates of numerical truth-values” in Joyce's sense) should obey th…
A New Garber-Style Solution to the Problem of Old Evidence
In this discussion note, we explain how to relax some of the standard assumptions made in Garber-style solutions to the Problem of Old Evidence. The result is a more general and explanatory Bayesian approach
Declarations of independence
Deference Done Better
There are many things—call them ‘experts'—that you should defer to in forming your opinions. The trouble is, many experts are modest : they're less than certain that they are worthy of deference. When this happens, the standard theories of deference break down: the most popular (“Reflection”‐style) principles collapse to inconsistency, while their most popular (“New‐Reflection”‐style) variants allow you to defer to someone while regarding them as…
A Problem for Confirmation Measure Z
In this article, I present a serious problem for confirmation measure Z
Four Approaches to Supposition
Suppositions can be introduced in either the indicative or subjunctive mood. There are also two types of judgments that may be initiated by suppositions of either sort: qualitative (binary) judgments and quantitative (numerical) ones. The former are judgments about whether a given proposition is acceptable and the latter are about how acceptable it is. We systematically explicate the relationships between canonical representatives of each of the …
Remarks on staffel on full belief
Accuracy-First Epistemology and Scientific Progress
The accuracy-first program attempts to ground epistemology in the norm that one’s beliefs should be as accurate as possible, where accuracy is measured using a scoring rule. We argue that considerations of scientific progress suggest that such a monism about epistemic value is untenable. In particular, we argue that counterexamples to the standard scoring rules are ubiquitous in the history of science, and hence that these scoring rules cannot be…
Philosophy (24 works) · Epistemology (23 works) · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics (17 works) · Computer Science (15 works) · Philosophy and History of Science (12 works) · Mathematics (8 works) · Philosophy and Theoretical Science (8 works) · Psychology (8 works) · Philosophy (7 works) · Artificial Intelligence (6 works)