Too Odd (Not) to Be True? A Reply to Olsson
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 11512151 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Luc Bovens (0000-0002-3937-1373, San Jose State University, corresponding author), Branden Fitelson (0000-0002-8847-220X, University of Konstanz), Stephan Hartmann (0000-0001-8676-2177, University of Konstanz), Josh Snyder (University of Konstanz) |
| Year | 2002 |
| Volume | 53 |
| Issue | 4 |
| Pages | 539-563 |
| Publication date | 2002-12-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0007-0882 • E-ISSN: 1464-3537 |
| Publisher | University of Chicago Press (PUBLISHER • US) |
| DOI | 10.1093/bjps/53.4.539 |
| OpenAlex | W2096042288 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 10 |
| References cited | 10 |
In ‘Corroborating Testimony, Probability and Surprise’, Erik J. Olsson ascribes to L. Jonathan Cohen the claims that if two witnesses provide us with the same information, then the less probable the information is, the more confident we may be that the information is true (C), and the stronger the information is corroborated (C*). We question whether Cohen intends anything like claims (C) and (C*). Furthermore, he discusses the concurrence of witness reports within a context of independent witnesses, whereas the witnesses in Olsson's model are not independent in the standard sense. We argue that there is much more than, in Olsson's words, ‘a grain of truth’ to claim (C), both on his own characterization as well as on Cohen's characterization of the witnesses. We present an analysis for independent witnesses in the contexts of decision‐making under risk and decision‐making under uncertainty and generalize the model for n witnesses. As to claim (C*), Olsson's argument is contingent on the choice of a particular measure of corroboration and is not robust in the face of alternative measures. Finally, we delimit the set of cases to which Olsson's model is applicable. 1 Claim (C) examined for Olsson's characterization of the relationship between the witnesses 2 Claim (C) examined for two or more independent witnesses 3 Robustness and multiple measures of corroboration 4 Discussion
Argument (complex analysis · Characterization (materials science · Context (archaeology · Epistemology · Linguistics · Robustness (evolution · Surprise · Witness · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · History · Jury Decision Making Processes · Law, Economics, and Judicial Systems · Philosophy · Psychology · Social Psychology
Against coherence
Conditionals and testimony
On Coherent Sets and the Transmission of Confirmation
Corroborating Testimony and Ignorance
Reconciling probability theory and coherentism
Reliability conducive measures of coherence
Guest editor’s introduction
Can We Trust Our Memories? C. I. Lewis's Coherence Argument
Weak Bayesian coherentism
Current Bibliography of the History of Science and Its Cultural Influences 2005
| Unique citing works | 10 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0,42 |
| Citation span | 2002 - 2020 (19) |
| Citation velocity | historical |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 10 |