Crime and War in Afghanistan

Part I: The Hobbesian Solution

Bibliographic Data

ID8401299
AuthorsJohn Braithwaite (0000-0001-8538-2404), Ali Wardak (University of South Wales)
Year2013
Volume53
Issue2
Pages179-196
Publication date2013-03-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessNo
TypeARTICLE
VenueThe British Journal of Criminology (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0007-0955 • E-ISSN: 1464-3529
PublisherOxford University Press (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1093/bjc/azs065
OpenAlexW2110150589
LanguageEN
Citations received24
References cited6

This article views Afghanistan less as a war, and more as a contest of criminalized justice systems. The Taliban came to power because they were able to restore order to spaces terrorized by armed gangs and Mujahideen factions. After the Taliban's 'defeat' in 2001, their resurgence was invited by the failure of state justice and security institutions. The Taliban returned with a parallel court system that most Afghans viewed as more effective and fair than the state system. Polls suggest judges were perceived as among the most corrupt elements of a corrupt state. Police were widely perceived as thieves of ordinary people's property, not protectors of it. While the US diagnosis of anomie in Afghanistan up to 2009 was aptly Hobbesian, its remedy of supporting President Hamid Karzai as a Leviathan was hardly apt. The West failed to ask in 2001 'What is working around here to provide people security?'. One answer to that question was jirga/shura. A more Jeffersonian rural republicanism that learnt from local traditions of dispute resolution defines a path not taken.

Computer security · Criminology · Political science · Computer Science · Politics and Conflicts in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Middle East · Psychology · Terrorism, Counterterrorism, and Political Violence · War, Ethics, and Justification

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