Voluntary Action, Chosen Action, and Resolve

Bibliographic Data

ID8410326
AuthorsJohn J Drummond (0000-0001-7197-2593, Fordham University, corresponding author)
Year2022
Volume53
Issue2
Pages133-144
Publication date2022-04-03
Open AccessNo
TypeARTICLE
VenueJournal of the British Society for Phenomenology (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0007-1773 • E-ISSN: 2332-0486
PublisherInforma UK Limited (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1080/00071773.2021.1977092
OpenAlexW3204466538
LanguageEN
Citations received3
References cited19

This paper provides a phenomenological account of the intentional structure of action. To establish the context, I first distinguish (a) physiological changes and the bodily motions manifesting them that one passively undergoes in response to external causes from (b) actions as such. With respect to actions, I further distinguish among what I call incomplete actions, voluntary actions, and chosen actions. I shall frame my discussion in terms of three similar distinctions, although my position will intersect but not coincide with any of them. The three distinctions are Edmund Husserl’s distinction between action-will and decision-will, John Searle’s distinction, as amended by John McDowell, between intention in action and a prior intention-to-do, and Aristotle’s distinction between voluntary and chosen action. The paper concludes with a discussion of a particular instance of chosen action that I call “resolve” and its relation to personal identity

Action (physics) · Agency (philosophy) · Epistemology · Physics · Voluntary action · Community Health and Development · Ethics in medical practice · Philosophy · Political Philosophy and Ethics

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