Oakeshott, Wittgenstein, and the Practice of Social Science

Bibliographic Data

ID8975472
AuthorsTimothy M Costelloe (Emory University, corresponding author)
Year1998
Volume28
Issue4
Pages323-347
Publication date1998-12-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueJournal for the Theory of Social Behaviour (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0021-8308 • E-ISSN: 1468-5914
PublisherWiley (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1111/1468-5914.00079
OpenAlexW2125587318
LanguageEN
Citations received4

This paper investigates the concept of “sociology” and the logical limits which, it is argued, are imposed upon its practice by the nature of the subject matter it investigates. This thesis is developed, first, by examining Michael Oakeshott’s distinction between “technical” and “practical” knowledge, and his concept of “abridgment”. The view of human action which follows from this is then applied to sociological practice in order to show how the latter involves a unique sort of abridgment. Then, drawing on Ludwig Wittgenstein's conception of philosophy, it is argued that sociological inquiry has its own form of investigation which is most accurately termed “description”. Finally, Harvey Sacks' notion of “primitive, natural science” is critically examined as an account of social science which approximates most closely to the one being articulated here. The weakness of Sacks’ account, it is suggested, can be explained by his failure to appreciate the Oakeshottian insights about human action with which the argument began. The paper concludes by drawing out some implications of the proposed thesis

Action (physics · Argument (complex analysis · Epistemology · Logical conjunction · Natural (archaeology · Order (exchange · Sociology · sort · Subject (documents · Computer Science · Philosophy · Philosophy, History, and Historiography · Pragmatism in Philosophy and Education · Wittgensteinian philosophy and applications

Tools

Open DOISci-Hub