To beckon or not to beckon
Testing a causal-evaluative modelling approach to moral judgment: A registered report
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 9006503 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Cillian Mchugh (0000-0002-9701-3232, University of Limerick, corresponding author), Kathryn B Francis (0000-0002-3875-8904, Keele University), Jim A C Everett (0000-0003-2801-5426, University of Kent), Shane Timmons (Economic and Social Research Institute) |
| Year | 2024 |
| Volume | 113 |
| Pages | 104616-104616 |
| Publication date | 2024-04-08 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Journal of Experimental Social Psychology (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0022-1031 • E-ISSN: 1096-0465 |
| Publisher | Elsevier BV (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1016/j.jesp.2024.104616 |
| OpenAlex | W4394590168 |
| Language | EN |
| References cited | 51 |
Moral judgments are increasingly being understood as showing context dependent variability. A growing literature has identified a range of specific contextual factors (e.g., emotions, intentions) that can influence moral judgments in predictable ways. Integrating these diverse influences into a unified approach to understanding moral judgments remains a challenge. Recent work by Railton (2017) attempted to address this with a causal-evaluative modelling approach to moral judgment. In support of this model Railton presents evidence from novel variations of classic trolley type dilemmas. We present results from a pre-registered pilot study that highlight a significant confound and demonstrate that it likely influenced Railton's results. Building on this, our registered report presents a replication-extension of Railton's study, using larger more diverse samples, and more rigorous methods and materials, specifically controlling for potential confounds. We found that participants' judgments in sacrificial dilemmas are influenced by both direct personal force, and by whether harm occurs as a means or as a side-effect of action. We also show the relationship between a range of individual difference variables and responses to sacrificial moral dilemmas. Our results provide novel insights into the factors that influence people's moral judgments, and contribute to ongoing theoretical debates in moral psychology
Ethics in Business and Education · Psychology · Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment · Social and Intergroup Psychology · Social Psychology
A Dissociation Between Moral Judgments and Justifications
The Theory of Dyadic Morality
Morality in everyday life
The Trolley Problem
Assessing miserly information processing
Why does the Cognitive Reflection Test (sometimes) predict utilitarian moral judgment (and other things)?
Beyond sacrificial harm
Action, Outcome, and Value
Moral dilemmas in cognitive neuroscience of moral decision-making
Universal moral grammar
Sacrificial utilitarian judgments do reflect concern for the greater good
Reflection and Reasoning in Moral Judgment
The Cognitive Reflection Test as a predictor of performance on heuristics-and-biases tasks
Investigating an alternate form of the cognitive reflection test
An fMRI Investigation of Emotional Engagement in Moral Judgment
In a Different Voice
Moral Judgment as Categorization (MJAC)
The Moral Psychology of Raceless, Genderless Strangers
The Importance of Context in Moral Judgments
Using the CNI Model to Investigate Individual Differences in Moral Dilemma Judgments
The puzzle of wrongless harms
Not just bad actions
Reasons or rationalizations
Mapping morality with a compass
Reflecting on God's will
When skeptical, stick with the norm
Concrete and abstract ways to deontology
Morality in high definition
Reasoning supports utilitarian resolutions to moral dilemmas across diverse measures
Deontological and utilitarian inclinations in moral decision making
The CAD triad hypothesis
Liberals and conservatives rely on different sets of moral foundations
Consequences, norms, and generalized inaction in moral dilemmas
The need for cognition
Cognitive Reflection and Decision Making
| Citation velocity | historical |
|---|---|
| Highly cited | No |