Preference Pollution, Reasons, and Other Murky Motivations
On some hidden costs of the market
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 9257115 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Lanse Minkler (corresponding author) |
| Year | 2004 |
| Volume | 62 |
| Issue | 2 |
| Pages | 263-271 |
| Publication date | 2004-06-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Review of Social Economy (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0034-6764 • E-ISSN: 1470-1162 |
| Publisher | Informa UK Limited (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1080/0034676042000183862 |
| OpenAlex | W2041187815 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 1 |
| References cited | 5 |
George's central claim, that competition and the market can lead to sub optimal welfare in ways not heretofore considered, arises from two sub claims. First, economic agents possess preferences over their own preferences. First-order preferences are usually endogenous, while the evaluative second order preferences usually are not. These preferences need not coincide. Second, sellers in the market generally find it in their interests to persuade consumers to favor their wares. Producing for consumers' firstrather than second-order preferences may be less costly. Simultaneous fulfillment of these two sub-claims gives rise to the possibility of a new kind of externality. So, if the cigarette industry finally convinces me of the devilish pleasures of smoking, and I act on that (new) first-order preferences despite my second order preference not to do so (I sure wish I didn't want to smoke), I will be worse off than my original state of fulfilling both my first and second order preferences of not smoking. The externality arises because the industry has taken welfare reducing actions (convincing me to smoke) for which it does not have to pay compensation. Presumably, there is a missing market preventing the industry from compensating me for changing my first-order preferences, or preventing me from bribing them to leave my preferences alone Neither sub-claim is novel. Various scholars have investigated multiple preference arguments, including Frankfurt, Sen, Etzioni, and Margolis. Likewise, even many of today's graduate students are aware of the possibility of endogenous preferences from the work of Galbraith or (more likely)
Compensation (psychology) · Competition (biology) · Economics · Externality · Market economy · Microeconomics · Order (exchange) · Preference · Welfare · Decision-Making and Behavioral Economics · Economic Theory and Institutions · Psychology · Social Psychology
| Unique citing works | 1 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0.06 |
| Citation span | 2009 - 2009 (1) |
| Citation velocity | historical |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 1 |