A little justification goes a long way
Audience costs and the EU referendum
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 9537640 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Susan Banducci (0000-0002-1874-5110, University of Exeter, corresponding author), Gregory Katz (0000-0001-5970-2769, University of Exeter), Gabriel Katz, Catarina Thomson, Catarina P Thomson (0000-0001-8220-5082, University of Exeter), Daniel Stevens (0000-0003-0990-8237, University of Exeter), Travis Coan, Travis G Coan (0000-0002-4587-3396, University of Exeter) |
| Year | 2020 |
| Volume | 55 |
| Issue | 2 |
| Pages | 305-326 |
| Publication date | 2020-04-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Acta Politica (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0001-6810 • E-ISSN: 1741-1416 |
| Publisher | Springer Science and Business Media LLC (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1057/s41269-018-0117-x |
| OpenAlex | W2888694134 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 2 |
| References cited | 28 |
That governments may not always keep their election promises or that they change policy positions may be unsurprising. However, failed promises, backing down on threats or flip-flopping on policy positions may be associated with a loss in support. Bringing together literature on the politics of electoral promises, policy shifts and audience costs, we examine the conditions under which a political leader can back down on a promise, using the EU referendum in the UK as a case study. Based on a survey experiment conducted in the aftermath of the 2015 general election, we examine whether justifications grounded on electoral motives, internal and external opposition would have allowed then Prime Minister David Cameron to avoid paying audience costs for going back on his campaign promise. Our results indicate that domestic audience costs might have been manageable, with only slightly more than a quarter of the participants in our study punishing executive inconsistency regardless of the justification employed. Of particular interest for European Union scholars, justifying backing down due to opposition from other EU member states is particularly effective in mitigating domestic audience costs
Comparative politics · Economics · European union · International economics · Opposition (politics · Political economy · Political science · Politics · Referendum · Electoral Systems and Political Participation · European Union Policy and Governance · Law · Political Influence and Corporate Strategies
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Domestic Audience Costs in International Relations
| Unique citing works | 2 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 1 |
| Citation span | 2024 - 2025 (2) |
| Citation velocity | recent |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 2 |