June 1940
The Italian Army and the Battle of the Alps
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 9636613 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Emanuele Sica (0000-0001-9054-8309, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2012 |
| Volume | 47 |
| Issue | 2 |
| Pages | 355-378 |
| Publication date | 2012-09-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Journal of History (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0008-4107 • E-ISSN: 2292-8502 |
| Publisher | University of Toronto Press Inc. (UTPress) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.3138/cjh.47.2.355 |
| OpenAlex | W337303334 |
| Language | EN |
This article focuses on the Battle of the Alps of June 1940, which pitted the Italian Regio Esercito against the French Armée des Alpes. Fearing that an early capitulation of France to the German invasion that had begun in May would prevent Italy from sharing the spoils of victory, Mussolini ordered an offensive against France on 15 June 1940. Despite the battle raging in the north, the French Army successfully repelled the attacking force and the Italian assault petered out after a few days, with no significant victories and few territorial gains. Aside from the difficulties of crossing the Alpine mountain range, a geographical feature the French had strongly fortified, the Italian campaign was hindered by poor strategy, ineffective tactics, an outdated military doctrine that failed to acknowledge the importance of combined arms warfare, and appallingly inadequate materiel owing to the erosion of the Italian military industrial base in the 1930s. In fact, the Battle of the Alps set the tone for the overall disappointing military campaign of the Regio Esercito in the Second World War, as the Italian army never fully recovered from its dismal start
Ancient history · Archaeology · Battle · Economic history · Geography · German · Political science · History · Italian Fascism and Post-war Society
| Citation velocity | historical |
|---|---|
| Highly cited | No |