The Deterrent Effect of Perceived Certainty and Severity of Punishment Revisited

Datos Bibliográficos

ID9680140
AutoresSteven Klepper (Carnegie Mellon University, autor de correspondencia), Daniel S Nagin (0000-0003-0075-1851, Carnegie Mellon University), Daniel Nagin
Año1989
Volumen27
Número4
Páginas721-746
Fecha de publicación1989-11-01
Peer ReviewedSí
Open AccessSí
TipoARTICLE
RevistaCriminology (JOURNAL)
Identificadores de la revistaISSN: 0011-1384 • E-ISSN: 1745-9125
EditorialWiley (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1111/j.1745-9125.1989.tb01052.x
OpenAlexW2026407894
IdiomaEN
Citas recibidas116
Referencias citadas31

This paper synthesizes and extends recent criticisms of cross‐sectional and panel studies of perceptual deterrence and then uses those criticisms to design a better cross‐sectional study. A series of scenarios involving the noncompliance of a hypothetical plumber were posed to a sample of predominantly middle‐aged administrators. The respondents were asked to estimate the probability that the noncompliance would be detected and, if detected, the probability that it would result in criminal prosecution. Respondents were also asked to project their own behavior if in the plumber's position. The results contrast sharply with prior findings, especially of the panel studies. Not only do perceptions of detection risk play an important role in deterring tax noncompliance, but fear of criminal prosecution appears to be a powerful deterrent

Certainty · Criminology · Deterrence (psychology · Economics · Perception · Position (finance · Punishment (psychology · Sample (material · Crime Patterns and Interventions · Crime, Illicit Activities, and Governance · Mathematics · Psychology · Social Psychology · Taxation and Compliance Studies