Beetles and Nothingness
Sartre, Wittgenstein, and First-Person Authority
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 9687761 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Michael Hymers (Dalhousie University, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2024 |
| Volume | 63 |
| Issue | 2 |
| Pages | 207-222 |
| Publication date | 2024-08-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Dialogue (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0012-2173 • E-ISSN: 1759-0949 |
| Publisher | Cambridge University Press (CUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1017/s0012217324000040 |
| OpenAlex | W4404530834 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 2 |
This article is inspired by two of Steven Burns's many philosophical interests — self-deception and Wittgenstein — as well as by a wariness that we share of the analytic-continental divide in contemporary philosophy. I argue here that, despite obvious differences of temperament and concern, Sartre and Wittgenstein share a scepticism about the “epistemic model” of first-person authority. This shared scepticism emerges in a striking way in their challenges to the idea that psychological phenomena should be understood on the model of objects in physical space. Wittgenstein's scepticism is more thorough-going, but emphasizing the similarity allows us to see Sartre as making an important contribution to our understanding of first-person authority, even if we are wary of the voluntarism of his approach
Epistemology · Nothing · Psychoanalysis · Philosophy · Psychology · Wittgensteinian philosophy and applications
| Unique citing works | 2 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 2 |
| Citation span | 2025 - 2026 (2) |
| Citation velocity | current |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 2 |