Expressing What You Say
Neo‐Expressivism and the Matching Question
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 20141867 |
|---|---|
| Authors | BENJAMIN WINOKUR (0000-0002-0845-9460, University of Macau Taipa China, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2025 |
| Volume | 91 |
| Issue | 5 |
| Publication date | 2025-10-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Theoria (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0040-5825 • E-ISSN: 1755-2567 |
| Publisher | Wiley (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1111/theo.70029 |
| OpenAlex | W4412011230 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 1 |
| References cited | 44 |
It is often appropriate to defer to one another when we ascribe mental states to ourselves in the present tense, even when these self‐ascriptions are evidentially unsupported. One way to explain this ‘first‐person authority’ is in terms of what such self‐ascriptions express . According to neo‐expressivism , the relevant expressed feature is the very mental state semantically represented by one's self‐ascription. Matthew Parrott worries that neo‐expressivists lack a strong explanation of the harmonious match between the semantic content of first‐person authoritative self‐ascriptions and the mental states that one expresses in these self‐ascriptive acts. In this paper, I pursue two explanations of why self‐ascriptions can be presumed to match in this respect. One might be better called a ‘neo’‐neo‐expressivist explanation because it carves out a crucial explanatory role for self‐knowledge, this being a role that is typically avoided in neo‐expressivist explanations of first‐person authority. The other is a defence and development of a more familiar neo‐expressivist explanation of the desired match. Both explanations are presented as live options that are not necessarily in tension with each other
Epistemology · Expressivism · Philosophy · Philosophy and Theoretical Science · Pragmatism in Philosophy and Education · Wittgensteinian philosophy and applications
Our Entitlement to Self-Knowledge
A Companion to the Philosophy of Mind
The First-Person Perspective and Other Essays
Expressivism, self-knowledge, and rational agency
How to commit to commissive self‐knowledge
Sharing Pain
Speaking My Mind
The Duck Quacks Back
First-Person Access
An expressivist solution to Moorean paradoxes
The transparency of expressivism
Two Kinds of Self‐Knowledge
Changing One's Mind
The Authority of Expressive Self-Ascriptions
Beetles and Nothingness
Philosophical investigations
Mind-making practices
Wittgenstein on Self-Knowledge and Self-Expression
| Unique citing works | 1 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 1 |
| Citation span | 2026 - 2026 (1) |
| Citation velocity | current |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 1 |