The Knowledge Intuition and the Ability Hypothesis
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 9687895 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Huiming Ren (0009-0009-3997-0892, Zhejiang University, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2012 |
| Volume | 51 |
| Issue | 2 |
| Pages | 313-326 |
| Publication date | 2012-06-01 |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Dialogue (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0012-2173 • E-ISSN: 1759-0949 |
| Publisher | Cambridge University Press (CUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1017/s0012217312000467 |
| OpenAlex | W2018902281 |
| Language | EN |
| References cited | 9 |
I argue that the Ability Hypothesis cannot really accommodate the knowledge intuition that drives the knowledge argument and therefore fails to defend physicalism. When the thought experiment is run with, instead of Mary, an advanced robot Rosemary, for whom there presumably is no distinction between knowledge-how and knowledge-that, proponents of the Ability Hypothesis would have to give a far-fetched and counterintuitive explanation of why Rosemary wouldn’t learn anything new upon release
Argument (complex analysis) · Cognitive psychology · Cognitive science · Counterintuitive · Epistemology · Intuition · Metaphysics · Physicalism · Computability, Logic, AI Algorithms · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Philosophy · Philosophy and Theoretical Science · Psychology
| Highly cited | No |
|---|