Huiming Ren
Biographic Data
| ID | 5723053 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Huiming Ren |
| GIVEN NAMES | Huiming |
| FAMILY NAME | Ren |
| SIGNATURE | REN H |
| AFFILIATIONS | Zhejiang University |
| ORCID | 0009-0009-3997-0892 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 3 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 0 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 3 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2012 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2025 |
| H-INDEX | 0 |
Acquaintance with One’s Own Thoughts
The more primitive kind of reasoning described by Peacocke (1996) requires that one know one’s own thoughts without self-ascribing them. I call this kind of self-knowledge ‘acquaintance with one’s own thoughts.’ I investigate acquaintance with one’s own thoughts and show that it consists in one’s grasp of the propositional content of one’s own thoughts, and one acquires such knowledge by listening to one’s inner speech. I further investigate the …
Why Did Frege Abandon the Metalinguistic Solution
The ongoing debate about whether Frege has ever abandoned the metalinguistic solution to Frege’s Puzzle not only is important by itself, but has serious ramifications. In this article, I show that Frege did abandon the metalinguistic solution and his objection to it is as follows. Though the co-reference relation between two signs is mediated by the connection of each of the two signs with the same designated thing, the connection is nevertheless…
The Knowledge Intuition and the Ability Hypothesis
I argue that the Ability Hypothesis cannot really accommodate the knowledge intuition that drives the knowledge argument and therefore fails to defend physicalism. When the thought experiment is run with, instead of Mary, an advanced robot Rosemary, for whom there presumably is no distinction between knowledge-how and knowledge-that, proponents of the Ability Hypothesis would have to give a far-fetched and counterintuitive explanation of why Rose…
No prominent works on this page.
The Knowledge Intuition and the Ability Hypothesis
I argue that the Ability Hypothesis cannot really accommodate the knowledge intuition that drives the knowledge argument and therefore fails to defend physicalism. When the thought experiment is run with, instead of Mary, an advanced robot Rosemary, for whom there presumably is no distinction between knowledge-how and knowledge-that, proponents of the Ability Hypothesis would have to give a far-fetched and counterintuitive explanation of why Rose…
Why Did Frege Abandon the Metalinguistic Solution
The ongoing debate about whether Frege has ever abandoned the metalinguistic solution to Frege’s Puzzle not only is important by itself, but has serious ramifications. In this article, I show that Frege did abandon the metalinguistic solution and his objection to it is as follows. Though the co-reference relation between two signs is mediated by the connection of each of the two signs with the same designated thing, the connection is nevertheless…
Acquaintance with One’s Own Thoughts
The more primitive kind of reasoning described by Peacocke (1996) requires that one know one’s own thoughts without self-ascribing them. I call this kind of self-knowledge ‘acquaintance with one’s own thoughts.’ I investigate acquaintance with one’s own thoughts and show that it consists in one’s grasp of the propositional content of one’s own thoughts, and one acquires such knowledge by listening to one’s inner speech. I further investigate the …
Epistemology (3 works) · Philosophy (3 works) · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics (2 works) · Philosophy and Theoretical Science (2 works) · Psychology (2 works) · Argument (complex analysis) (1 work) · Cognitive psychology (1 work) · Cognitive science (1 work) · Computability, Logic, AI Algorithms (1 work) · Counterintuitive (1 work)