Physicalism and the Intrinsic Nature of Consciousness

Bibliographic Data

ID9688424
AuthorsPATRICK LEWTAS, Patrick K Lewtas (American University of Beirut, corresponding author)
Year2014
Volume53
Issue2
Pages203-228
Publication date2014-06-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueDialogue (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0012-2173 • E-ISSN: 1759-0949
PublisherCambridge University Press (CUP) (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1017/s0012217314000237
OpenAlexW2940835018
LanguageEN
References cited32

This paper presents a metaphysical argument against physicalism based on the distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic properties. It argues that the physical, as physicalism must understand it, consists entirely of extrinsic properties, whereas consciousness involves at least some intrinsic properties. It concludes that consciousness has non-physical properties and that physicalism is false. The paper then defends its premises against current physicalist thinking. As much as possible, it offers metaphysical arguments about physical and conscious properties rather than epistemological arguments about our physical and phenomenal concepts

Argument (complex analysis) · Consciousness · Epistemology · Metaphysics · Physicalism · Chemistry · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Philosophy · Philosophy and History of Science · Philosophy and Theoretical Science

Tools

Open DOISci-Hub