Putnam, Reference and Essentialism
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 9688724 |
|---|---|
| Authors | John Weckert (corresponding author) |
| Year | 1986 |
| Volume | 25 |
| Issue | 3 |
| Pages | 509-521 |
| Publication date | 1986-01-01 |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Dialogue (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0012-2173 • E-ISSN: 1759-0949 |
| Publisher | Cambridge University Press (CUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1017/s0012217300020916 |
| OpenAlex | W2110314601 |
| Language | EN |
| References cited | 6 |
In Putnam's theory of reference, an historical component and an indexical one both play some part in establishing the extension of terms, although in “The meaning of ‘meaning’” it is not altogether clear just how important he believes the historical element to be. He seems to be much more interested in its indexical component, which he believes plays more or less the same role in his theory as rigidity does in Krip-ke's. In this paper, I will look more closely at these two elements and see what sorts of roles they could play in a theory like Putnam's. A theory of the extensions of general terms will emerge which differs from Putnam's in some important respects. It does, however, have some similarity with a recently published theory of Matthen's, but the arguments are different. I will also outline a theory of essences and kinds, which is based on this modified version
Causal theory of reference · Element (criminal law) · Epistemology · Essentialism · Extension (predicate logic) · General theory · Indexicality · Mathematical economics · Meaning (existential) · Optimal distinctiveness theory · Sociology · Computer Science · Law · Mathematics · Philosophy · Philosophy and History of Science · Philosophy and Theoretical Science · Philosophy, Science, and History · Psychology · Social Psychology
| Highly cited | No |
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