Reasons and the First-Person
Explanatory Exclusion and Explanatory Pluralism
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 9688833 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Neil Campbell (0000-0003-2313-6608, Wilfrid Laurier University, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2013 |
| Volume | 52 |
| Issue | 1 |
| Pages | 25-42 |
| Publication date | 2013-03-01 |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Dialogue (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0012-2173 • E-ISSN: 1759-0949 |
| Publisher | Cambridge University Press (CUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1017/s0012217313000346 |
| OpenAlex | W1965022744 |
| Language | EN |
| References cited | 10 |
In two recent papers, Jaegwon Kim offers an account of action explanation that is agent-centered and reasons-based. I argue that, despite his claims to the contrary, Kim’s proposal points the way to a pluralist view of explanation that might resolve the problem of explanatory exclusion and provide a way for nonreductive physicalists to escape the supervenience/exclusion argument
Action (physics) · Argument (complex analysis) · Economics · Epistemology · Explanatory model · Metaphysics · Pluralism (philosophy) · Positive economics · Sociology · Supervenience · Free Will and Agency · Neuroethics, Human Enhancement, Biomedical Innovations · Philosophy · Philosophy and Theoretical Science
| Highly cited | No |
|---|