Fischer on the Fragilist Account of Alternative Possibilities
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 9690233 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Huiyuhl Yi (0000-0002-2221-6406, Ulsan National Institute of Science and Technology, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2013 |
| Volume | 52 |
| Issue | 4 |
| Pages | 787-800 |
| Publication date | 2013-12-01 |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Dialogue (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0012-2173 • E-ISSN: 1759-0949 |
| Publisher | Cambridge University Press (CUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1017/s0012217313000772 |
| OpenAlex | W2167737350 |
| Language | EN |
| References cited | 10 |
One response to the Frankfurtian attack on the Principle of Alternate Possibilities is to advert to the observation that the agent’s actual action (or the particular event resulting from that action) is numerically distinct from the corresponding action (or the resultant event) he would have generated in the relevant counterfactual scenario. Since this response is based on taking actions and events to be fragile, I shall call it the fragilist account of alternative possibilities. This paper addresses an anti-fragilist argument delivered by John Martin Fischer. I contend that, on close examination, Fischer’s counterargument does not undermine the fragilist account
Action (physics) · Argument (complex analysis) · Counterfactual thinking · Economics · Epistemology · Event (particle physics) · Law and economics · Physics · Positive economics · Free Will and Agency · Neuroethics, Human Enhancement, Biomedical Innovations · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Philosophy
| Highly cited | No |
|---|