Rational Ritual
Culture, Coordination, and Common Knowledge
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 9703140 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Aviad Heifetz (0000-0003-0877-7263, Tel Aviv University, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2004 |
| Volume | 114 |
| Issue | 493 |
| Pages | F146-F147 |
| Publication date | 2004-02-01 |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | REVIEW |
| Review of | Rational Ritual: Culture, Coordination, and Common Knowledge, Michael Suk-Young Chwe, 2013 |
| Venue | The Economic Journal (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0013-0133 • E-ISSN: 1468-0297 |
| Publisher | Oxford University Press (OUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1111/j.0013-0133.2004.191_4.x |
| OpenAlex | W2017028046 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 1 |
This book highlights one particular aspect of culture – that of enabling common knowledge among individuals. A fact is common knowledge if everybody knows it; everybody knows that everybody knows it; and so on ad infinitum. For Economists and Game Theorists, it is well known that common knowledge (and not just mutual knowledge) is essential for achieving coordination (Rubinstein, 1989). In a nutshell, if participating in a public enterprise – from stag‐hunt to underground activities – would turn very sour for each participant unless everybody (or at least enough other people) participates, each individual might avoid the enterprise altogether in the lack of common knowledge that everybody indeed opts in. Embarking from this theoretical insight, Chwe discusses a remarkable array of examples of social institutions and arrangements that bring about common knowledge. These include public ceremonies, rituals, parades and dances to announce and recognise authority and norms; inward facing architecture; focal‐place‐and‐time advertisement of items whose value to individuals hinges on collective consumption or awareness; cohesive social networks; and many more. The appendix delivers an accessible presentation of the abstract formulation of knowledge and common knowledge
Common ground · Common knowledge (logic · Common sense · Epistemology · Law and economics · Political science · Presentation (obstetrics · Public relations · Sociology · Value (mathematics · Artificial Intelligence · Business Strategy and Innovation · Communication · Computer Science · Economic Theory and Institutions · Law · Philosophy
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| Highly cited | No |
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