Strategic Disclosure of Research Results
The Cost of Proving Your Honesty
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 9703811 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Emeric Henry (0000-0001-9851-084X, London Business School, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2009 |
| Volume | 119 |
| Issue | 539 |
| Pages | 1036-1064 |
| Publication date | 2009-07-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | The Economic Journal (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0013-0133 • E-ISSN: 1468-0297 |
| Publisher | Oxford University Press (OUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1111/j.1468-0297.2009.02265.x |
| OpenAlex | W2136551731 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 8 |
| References cited | 8 |
In situations where a biased sender provides verifiable information to a receiver, I study how strategic reporting affects the incentives to search for information. Research provides series of signals that can be used selectively in reporting. I show that the sender is strictly worse off when his research effort is not observed by the receiver: he has to conduct more research than in the observable case and in equilibrium, discloses all the information he obtained. However this extra research can be socially beneficial and mandatory disclosure of results can thus be welfare reducing. Finally I identify cases where the sender withholds evidence and for which mandatory disclosure rules become more attractive. Copyright © The Author(s). Journal compilation © Royal Economic Society 2009
Economics · Honesty · Management · Political science · Public relations · Auditing, Earnings Management, Governance · Financial Markets and Investment Strategies · Law · Media Influence and Politics · Psychology
| Unique citing works | 8 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0,44 |
| Citation span | 2008 - 2024 (17) |
| Citation velocity | recent |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 7 |