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Implications of Endogenous Group Formation for Efficient Risk‐Sharing

Bibliographic Data

ID9704404
AuthorsTessa Bold (New College, Oxford, corresponding author)
Year2009
Volume119
Issue536
Pages562-591
Publication date2009-03-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueThe Economic Journal (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0013-0133 • E-ISSN: 1468-0297
PublisherOxford University Press (OUP) (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1111/j.1468-0297.2008.02245.x
OpenAlexW2085838161
LanguageEN
Citations received3
References cited36

The existing literature on sub-game perfect risk-sharing suffers from a basic inconsistency. While a group of size "n" is able to coordinate on a risk-sharing outcome, it is assumed that deviating subgroups cannot. I relax this assumption and characterise the optimal contract among all coalition-proof history-dependent contracts. This alters the predictions of the standard dynamic limited commitment model. I show that the consumption of constrained agents depends on both the history of shocks and its interaction with the current income of other constrained agents. From this, I derive a formal test for the presence of endogenous group formation under limited commitment. Copyright © The Author(s). Journal compilation © Royal Economic Society 2009

Group (periodic table · Law and economics · Political science · Sociology · Agricultural risk and resilience · Financial Literacy, Pension, Retirement Analysis · Income, Poverty, and Inequality

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    Open Access•Fernando Jaramillo, Hubert Kempf et al.•Journal of Development Economics•2014

  • Group Size and the Efficiency of Informal Risk Sharing

    Open Access•Elizabeth Fitzsimons, Emla Fitzsimons et al.•The Economic Journal•2018

  • Informal Insurance Arrangements with Limited Commitment

    Ethan Ligon, Jonathan P Thomas et al.•The Review of Economic Studies•2002

  • Coalition-Proof Nash Equilibria I. Concepts

    Open Access•B Douglas Bernheim, Bezalel Peleg et al.•Journal of Economic Theory•1987

  • On the Theory of Infinitely Repeated Games with Discounting

    Dilip Abreu•Econometrica•1988

  • The equity premium

    Open Access•Rajnish Mehra, Edward C Prescott•Journal of Monetary Economics•1985

  • Risk and Insurance in a Rural Credit Market

    Christopher Udry•The Review of Economic Studies•1994

  • Risk and Insurance in Village India

    Robert M Townsend•Econometrica•1994

  • Implications of Efficient Risk Sharing without Commitment

    Narayana Kocherlakota, N R Kocherlakota•The Review of Economic Studies•1996

  • Household Intertemporal Behaviour

    Maurizio Mazzocco•The Review of Economic Studies•2007

  • Household consumption smoothing through ethnic ties

    Open Access•Franque Grimard•Journal of Development Economics•1997

  • Reciprocity without commitment

    Open Access•Stephen Coate, Martin Ravallion•Journal of Development Economics•1993

  • Risk-sharing networks in rural Philippines

    Open Access•Marcel Fafchamps, Susan Lund•Journal of Development Economics•2003

  • Localized and incomplete mutual insurance

    Open Access•Rinku Murgai, Paul Winters et al.•Journal of Development Economics•2002

  • Risk-sharing networks and insurance against illness

    Open Access•Joachim De Weerdt, Stefan Dercon•Journal of Development Economics•2006

  • Self-Enforcing Wage Contracts

    Jonathan Thomas, Tim Worrall•The Review of Economic Studies•1988

  • In Sickness and in Health

    Stefan Dercon, Pramila Krishnan•Journal of Political Economy•2000

  • Full Insurance in the Presence of Aggregate Uncertainty

    Barbara J Mace•Journal of Political Economy•1991

Unique citing works3
Citations per year0,25
Citation span2014 - 2021 (8)
Citation velocityhistorical
Highly citedNo
Citation typesNeutral: 3

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