Group Size and the Efficiency of Informal Risk Sharing
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 9714176 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Elizabeth Fitzsimons (0000-0003-4466-5963, University of Kent), Emla Fitzsimons, Bansi Malde (0000-0003-1323-3383, University of Kent, corresponding author), Marcos Vera‐hernández (0000-0003-4128-8883, University of Kent) |
| Year | 2018 |
| Volume | 128 |
| Issue | 612 |
| Pages | F575-F608 |
| Publication date | 2018-07-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | The Economic Journal (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0013-0133 • E-ISSN: 1468-0297 |
| Publisher | Oxford University Press (OUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1111/ecoj.12565 |
| OpenAlex | W3122746966 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 4 |
| References cited | 39 |
This paper studies the relationship between group size and informal risk sharing. It shows that under limited commitment with coalitional deviations, this relationship is theoretically ambiguous. It investigates this question empirically using data on sibship size of household heads and spouses from rural Malawi, exploiting a social norm among the main sample ethnic group to define the potential risk sharing group. We uncover evidence of worse risk sharing of crop losses in larger potential risk sharing groups, and rule out alternative explanations for the findings. A simple calibration exercise indicates that our empirical findings are consistent with the theory
Econometrics · Economics · Ethnic group · Group (periodic table · Microeconomics · Norm (philosophy · Political science · Sample (material · Sample size determination · Sociology · Statistics · Agricultural risk and resilience · Mathematics · Microfinance and Financial Inclusion · Poverty, Education, and Child Welfare
Informal Insurance Arrangements with Limited Commitment
Coalition-Proof Nash Equilibria I. Concepts
Social Capital and Social Quilts
Estimating Time Preferences from Convex Budgets
Risk and Insurance in Village India
Implications of Efficient Risk Sharing without Commitment
Does Africa Need a Rotten Kin Theorem? Experimental Evidence from Village Economies
Imperfect Commitment, Altruism, and the Family
Informal insurance in social networks
Risk Sharing in Village Economies Revisited
Matriliny, Patriliny, and Wealth Flow Variations in Rural Malawi
The economic consequences of mutual help in extended families
Child labor and agricultural shocks
Nutrition, information and household behavior
Wage shocks and consumption variability in Mexico during the 1990s
The formation of risk sharing networks
Risk-sharing networks in rural Philippines
Localized and incomplete mutual insurance
Consumption Smoothing, Migration, and Marriage
Full Insurance in the Presence of Aggregate Uncertainty
Risk, Implicit Contracts and the Family in Rural Areas of Low-Income Countries
Consumption and Investment in Resource Pooling Family Networks
Implications of Endogenous Group Formation for Efficient Risk‐Sharing
Some Changes in the Matrilineal Family System among the Chewa of Malawi since the Nineteenth Century
Consumption Insurance
Nonmarket Institutions for Credit and Risk Sharing in Low-Income Countries
Striving for normality in a time of Aids in Malawi
Risk Sharing within the Extended Family
Migration, Remittances, and the Family
The Missing Transfers
African Systems of Kinship and Marriage
Sibling support and the educational prospects of young adults in Malawi
| Unique citing works | 4 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0,67 |
| Citation span | 2020 - 2025 (6) |
| Citation velocity | recent |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 4 |