Social Composition, Social Conflict and Economic Development
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 9704478 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Holger Strulik (0000-0002-5615-2412, University of Hannover, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2008 |
| Volume | 118 |
| Issue | 530 |
| Pages | 1145-1170 |
| Publication date | 2008-07-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | The Economic Journal (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0013-0133 • E-ISSN: 1468-0297 |
| Publisher | Oxford University Press (OUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1111/j.1468-0297.2008.02164.x |
| OpenAlex | W1591993854 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 4 |
| References cited | 37 |
This article shows within a simple growth model how the make up of society affects economic performance when property rights are unenforceable. It investigates behavior of non-cooperative social groups that consume, produce, and appropriate resources either peacefully or through contest. For the case of symmetric groups it is shown that economic growth is generated only in peaceful societies. For the case of asymmetric groups rebel-equilibria are investigated in which a large majority behaves peacefully although challenged by an aggressive minority. In each case it is shown how the possibility of conflict and its intensity and the rate of economic growth depend on social fractionalizaton, general productivity of the economy, and the ease at which resources are appropriated. A final part extends the analysis towards behavior of non-benevolent social elites
Consumption (sociology · CONTEST · Development economics · Economic system · Economics · Ethnic group · Fractionalization · Investment (military · Microeconomics · Political science · Politics · Property rights · Rent-seeking · Social conflict · Sociology · Culture, Economy, and Development Studies · Economic theories and models · Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies · Law
Power, growth, and the voracity effect
The Middle Class Consensus and Economic Development
Ethnic Polarization, Potential Conflict, and Civil Wars
Why Don't Poor Countries Catch Up? A Cross‐national Test of an Institutional Explanation
Where Did All the Growth Go? External Shocks, Social Conflict, and Growth Collapses
The Varieties of Resource Experience
Explaining African Economic Performance
Ethnic Diversity and Economic Performance
The Voracity Effect
Institutions Rule
Institutions and Economic Performance
The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development
Africa's Growth Tragedy
Fractionalization
On the Measurement of Polarization
Corruption and Growth
Greed and grievance in civil war
Why not Africa? – Growth and Welfare Effects of Secure Property Rights
The analytics of continuing conflict
Anarchy and its Breakdown
Social Fractionalization, Endogenous Appropriation Norms, and Economic Development
Institutions and the Resource Curse
Kleptocracy and Divide-and-Rule
Tropics, germs, and crops
Why do Some Countries Produce So Much More Output Per Worker than Others
The Paradox of Power
Can Institutions Resolve Ethnic Conflict
The terrible toll of post-colonial 'rebel movements' in Africa
Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War
| Unique citing works | 4 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0,22 |
| Citation span | 2008 - 2013 (6) |
| Citation velocity | historical |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 4 |