Social Fractionalization, Endogenous Appropriation Norms, and Economic Development
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 9722136 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Ines Lindner (0000-0003-4072-3820, Utrecht University), Holger Strulik (0000-0002-5615-2412, Leibniz University Hannover) |
| Year | 2008 |
| Volume | 75 |
| Issue | 298 |
| Pages | 244-258 |
| Publication date | 2008-05-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Economica (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0013-0427 • E-ISSN: 1468-0335 |
| Publisher | Wiley (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1111/j.1468-0335.2007.00614.x |
| OpenAlex | W2039071125 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 3 |
| References cited | 33 |
We investigate how social composition affects competitive and cooperative behaviour in a linear growth model without secure property rights. If a society is homogeneous or highly fractionalized, it is in the self‐interest of people to cooperate. The first‐best allocation is enforced through trigger strategies, and growth is independent from social structure. If a society is polarized, i.e. if it consists of a small number of groups, the first‐best solution can turn out to be unenforceable and groups will follow an exploitative strategy. In this case, the rate of growth is monotonously decreasing in the degree of fractionalization
Appropriation · Economic system · Economics · Endogenous growth theory · Fractionalization · Homogeneous · Market economy · Microeconomics · Political science · Property rights · Culture, Economy, and Development Studies · Economic theories and models · Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies · Law · Mathematics
Power, growth, and the voracity effect
Conflict and Distribution
Ethnic Polarization, Potential Conflict, and Civil Wars
Why Don't Poor Countries Catch Up? A Cross‐national Test of an Institutional Explanation
Explaining African Economic Performance
Institutions Rule
The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development
Africa's Growth Tragedy
Reversal of Fortune
Fractionalization
The Functions of Social Conflict
On the Measurement of Polarization
Corruption and Growth
Polarization, Politics and Property Rights
Why not Africa? – Growth and Welfare Effects of Secure Property Rights
Intertemporal Substitution in Consumption
Measuring Intertemporal Substitution
Anarchy and its Breakdown
Trust and Growth
Imagined communities
Tropics, germs, and crops
Geography, Demography, and Economic Growth in Africa
Why do Some Countries Produce So Much More Output Per Worker than Others
Explaining Interethnic Cooperation
Imagined Communities. Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism
| Unique citing works | 3 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0,17 |
| Citation span | 2008 - 2012 (5) |
| Citation velocity | historical |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 3 |