Ines Lindner
Biographic Data
| ID | 125592 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Ines Lindner |
| GIVEN NAMES | Ines |
| FAMILY NAME | Lindner |
| SIGNATURE | LINDNER I |
| AFFILIATIONS | Utrecht University |
| ORCID | 0000-0003-4072-3820 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 9 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 16 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 9 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2004 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2019 |
| H-INDEX | 2 |
Naïve learning in social networks with random communication
Diffusion of behavior in network games with threshold dynamics
From tradition to modernity: Economic growth in a small world
Networks and collective action
Mass-mobilization with noisy conditional beliefs
Social Fractionalization, Endogenous Appropriation Norms, and Economic Development
We investigate how social composition affects competitive and cooperative behaviour in a linear growth model without secure property rights. If a society is homogeneous or highly fractionalized, it is in the self‐interest of people to cooperate. The first‐best allocation is enforced through trigger strategies, and growth is independent from social structure. If a society is polarized, i.e. if it consists of a small number of groups, the first‐bes…
Cases where the Penrose limit theorem does not hold
L.S. Penrose's limit theorem: Proof of some special cases
Why not Africa? – Growth and Welfare Effects of Secure Property Rights
L.S. Penrose's limit theorem: Proof of some special cases
Social Fractionalization, Endogenous Appropriation Norms, and Economic Development
We investigate how social composition affects competitive and cooperative behaviour in a linear growth model without secure property rights. If a society is homogeneous or highly fractionalized, it is in the self‐interest of people to cooperate. The first‐best allocation is enforced through trigger strategies, and growth is independent from social structure. If a society is polarized, i.e. if it consists of a small number of groups, the first‐bes…
Cases where the Penrose limit theorem does not hold
Why not Africa? – Growth and Welfare Effects of Secure Property Rights
Naïve learning in social networks with random communication
L.S. Penrose's limit theorem: Proof of some special cases
Why not Africa? – Growth and Welfare Effects of Secure Property Rights
Cases where the Penrose limit theorem does not hold
Mass-mobilization with noisy conditional beliefs
Social Fractionalization, Endogenous Appropriation Norms, and Economic Development
We investigate how social composition affects competitive and cooperative behaviour in a linear growth model without secure property rights. If a society is homogeneous or highly fractionalized, it is in the self‐interest of people to cooperate. The first‐best allocation is enforced through trigger strategies, and growth is independent from social structure. If a society is polarized, i.e. if it consists of a small number of groups, the first‐bes…
Networks and collective action
From tradition to modernity: Economic growth in a small world
Diffusion of behavior in network games with threshold dynamics
Naïve learning in social networks with random communication
Mathematics (6 works) · Computer Science (5 works) · Economics (5 works) · Discrete mathematics (4 works) · Law (4 works) · Mathematical economics (4 works) · Opinion Dynamics and Social Influence (4 works) · Political science (4 works) · Artificial Intelligence (3 works) · Combinatorics (3 works)