On Smiles, Winks and Handshakes as Coordination Devices
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 9706418 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Paola Manzini (0000-0001-5474-0512, Queen Mary, University of London and IZA), Abdolkarim Sadrieh (0000-0002-9322-4729, University of Magdeburg), Nicolaas J Vriend (Queen Mary University of London) |
| Year | 2009 |
| Volume | 119 |
| Issue | 537 |
| Pages | 826-854 |
| Publication date | 2009-04-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | The Economic Journal (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0013-0133 • E-ISSN: 1468-0297 |
| Publisher | Oxford University Press (OUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1111/j.1468-0297.2009.02253.x |
| OpenAlex | W3083760345 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 2 |
| References cited | 26 |
In an experimental study we examine a variant of the 'minimum effort game' , a coordination game with Pareto ranked equilibria, and risk considerations pointing to the least efficient equilibrium. We focus on the question whether simple cues such as smiles, winks and handshakes could be recognized and employed by the players as a tell-tale sign of each other's trustworthiness , thus enabling them to coordinate on the more risky but more rewarding Pareto efficient equilibrium. Our experimental results show that such cues may indeed play a role as coordination devices as their information value is significant and substantial
Computer security · Coordination failure · Coordination game · Economics · Focus (optics · Machine learning · Microeconomics · Multi-objective optimization · Operations management · Pareto optimal · Pareto principle · Sign (mathematics · Trustworthiness · Value (mathematics · Computer Science · Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies · Game Theory and Applications · Game Theory and Voting Systems · Mathematics
| Unique citing works | 2 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0,17 |
| Citation span | 2014 - 2014 (1) |
| Citation velocity | historical |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 2 |