Paola Manzini
Biographic Data
| ID | 5729178 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Paola Manzini |
| GIVEN NAMES | Paola |
| FAMILY NAME | Manzini |
| SIGNATURE | MANZINI P |
| AFFILIATIONS | IZA - Institute of Labor Economics |
| ORCID | 0000-0001-5474-0512 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 7 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 4 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 7 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2004 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2022 |
| H-INDEX | 1 |
Mixture Choice Data: Revealing Preferences and Cognition
Mixture choice data consist of the joint distribution of choices of a group of agents from a collection of menus, comprising the implied stochastic choice function plus any cross-menu correlations. When agents are heterogeneous with respect to both preferences and other aspects of cognition, we show that these two determinants of behavior are identified simultaneously by suitable mixture choice data. We also demonstrate how this finding can be ex…
Stochastic Complementarity
The Hicksian definition of complementarity and substitutability may not apply in contexts in which agents are not utility maximisers or where price or income vari- ations, whether implicit or explicit, are not available. We look for tools to identify complementarity and substitutability satisfying the following criteria: they are be- havioural (based only on observable choice data); model-free (valid whether the agent is rational or not); and the…
Competing for Attention: Is the Showiest Also the Best
There are many situations in which alternatives ranked by quality wish to be chosen and compete for the imperfect attention of a chooser by selecting their own salience. The chooser may be "tricked" into choosing more salient but inferior alternatives. We investigate when competitive forces ensure instead that (strictly) higher salience is diagnostic of (strictly) higher quality, and the most frequently chosen alternative is the best one. We prov…
CHAPTER 10 Choice over Time
This chapter reviews both the theoretical modeling and the experimental evidence, relating to choice over time. Most of the space is devoted to choices between outcome‐date pairs, which has been better studied, especially experimentally, but it also discusses choices between time sequences of outcomes. It distinguishes between “soft anomalies”, which can be accommodated by a simple modification of the standard exponential discounting model (e.g. …
On Smiles, Winks and Handshakes as Coordination Devices
In an experimental study we examine a variant of the 'minimum effort game' , a coordination game with Pareto ranked equilibria, and risk considerations pointing to the least efficient equilibrium. We focus on the question whether simple cues such as smiles, winks and handshakes could be recognized and employed by the players as a tell-tale sign of each other's trustworthiness , thus enabling them to coordinate on the more risky but more rewarding…
Stakeholders in bilateral conflict
Going Alone Together: Joint Outside Options in Bilateral Negotiations
Several contractual situations are such that the parties may 'step out' of negotiations and take up outside opportunities only if there is mutual consent to do so. Examples include employer - employee negotiations, divorce and inheritance procedures, and arbitration. To analyse such cases we develop the general concept of a 'joint outside option' and study its effect in the standard bargaining game. Examples from the international trade and theor…
Mixture Choice Data: Revealing Preferences and Cognition
Mixture choice data consist of the joint distribution of choices of a group of agents from a collection of menus, comprising the implied stochastic choice function plus any cross-menu correlations. When agents are heterogeneous with respect to both preferences and other aspects of cognition, we show that these two determinants of behavior are identified simultaneously by suitable mixture choice data. We also demonstrate how this finding can be ex…
Competing for Attention: Is the Showiest Also the Best
There are many situations in which alternatives ranked by quality wish to be chosen and compete for the imperfect attention of a chooser by selecting their own salience. The chooser may be "tricked" into choosing more salient but inferior alternatives. We investigate when competitive forces ensure instead that (strictly) higher salience is diagnostic of (strictly) higher quality, and the most frequently chosen alternative is the best one. We prov…
On Smiles, Winks and Handshakes as Coordination Devices
In an experimental study we examine a variant of the 'minimum effort game' , a coordination game with Pareto ranked equilibria, and risk considerations pointing to the least efficient equilibrium. We focus on the question whether simple cues such as smiles, winks and handshakes could be recognized and employed by the players as a tell-tale sign of each other's trustworthiness , thus enabling them to coordinate on the more risky but more rewarding…
Stakeholders in bilateral conflict
Going Alone Together: Joint Outside Options in Bilateral Negotiations
Several contractual situations are such that the parties may 'step out' of negotiations and take up outside opportunities only if there is mutual consent to do so. Examples include employer - employee negotiations, divorce and inheritance procedures, and arbitration. To analyse such cases we develop the general concept of a 'joint outside option' and study its effect in the standard bargaining game. Examples from the international trade and theor…
Stakeholders in bilateral conflict
CHAPTER 10 Choice over Time
This chapter reviews both the theoretical modeling and the experimental evidence, relating to choice over time. Most of the space is devoted to choices between outcome‐date pairs, which has been better studied, especially experimentally, but it also discusses choices between time sequences of outcomes. It distinguishes between “soft anomalies”, which can be accommodated by a simple modification of the standard exponential discounting model (e.g. …
On Smiles, Winks and Handshakes as Coordination Devices
In an experimental study we examine a variant of the 'minimum effort game' , a coordination game with Pareto ranked equilibria, and risk considerations pointing to the least efficient equilibrium. We focus on the question whether simple cues such as smiles, winks and handshakes could be recognized and employed by the players as a tell-tale sign of each other's trustworthiness , thus enabling them to coordinate on the more risky but more rewarding…
Competing for Attention: Is the Showiest Also the Best
There are many situations in which alternatives ranked by quality wish to be chosen and compete for the imperfect attention of a chooser by selecting their own salience. The chooser may be "tricked" into choosing more salient but inferior alternatives. We investigate when competitive forces ensure instead that (strictly) higher salience is diagnostic of (strictly) higher quality, and the most frequently chosen alternative is the best one. We prov…
Stochastic Complementarity
The Hicksian definition of complementarity and substitutability may not apply in contexts in which agents are not utility maximisers or where price or income vari- ations, whether implicit or explicit, are not available. We look for tools to identify complementarity and substitutability satisfying the following criteria: they are be- havioural (based only on observable choice data); model-free (valid whether the agent is rational or not); and the…
Mixture Choice Data: Revealing Preferences and Cognition
Mixture choice data consist of the joint distribution of choices of a group of agents from a collection of menus, comprising the implied stochastic choice function plus any cross-menu correlations. When agents are heterogeneous with respect to both preferences and other aspects of cognition, we show that these two determinants of behavior are identified simultaneously by suitable mixture choice data. We also demonstrate how this finding can be ex…
Economics (7 works) · Microeconomics (6 works) · Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies (4 works) · Decision-Making and Behavioral Economics (3 works) · Econometrics (3 works) · Law (3 works) · Law (3 works) · Political science (3 works) · Business (2 works) · Cognitive psychology (2 works)