Protection Without Discrimination

Bibliographic Data

ID9706735
AuthorsVincent Rebeyrol (Toulouse School of Economics, corresponding author)
Year2023
Volume133
Issue655
Pages2807-2827
Publication date2023-09-11
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueThe Economic Journal (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0013-0133 • E-ISSN: 1468-0297
PublisherOxford University Press (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1093/ej/uead046
OpenAlexW3080152739
LanguageEN
Citations received2
References cited30

This paper shows that non-tariff measures may fully respect the non-discrimination principle of the World Trade Organisation and still act as a protectionist device. Non-tariff measures that raise costs of all firms induce some exit, reallocating market shares towards the most efficient firms. The paper analyses when this mechanism generates protectionism. With political economy motives, trade liberalisation increases the use of non-tariff measures in the non-cooperative equilibrium and a trade agreement may be welfare reducing if governments care about the most efficient firms only. Moreover, a Pareto improving agreement may require an income redistribution between countries if firm average productivity differs across countries

Economics · Free trade · International economics · International trade · Liberalization · Macroeconomics · Market economy · Pareto principle · Politics · Productivity · Protectionism · Redistribution (election · Tariff · Welfare · Global Trade and Competitiveness · Global trade and economics · World Trade Organization Law

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