Compulsory Licensing and Patent Protection
A North‐South Perspective
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 9707243 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Eric W Bond (0000-0001-7028-1125, Vanderbilt University), Kamal Saggi (Vanderbilt University) |
| Year | 2018 |
| Volume | 128 |
| Issue | 610 |
| Pages | 1157-1179 |
| Publication date | 2018-05-01 |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | The Economic Journal (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0013-0133 • E-ISSN: 1468-0297 |
| Publisher | Oxford University Press (OUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1111/ecoj.12434 |
| OpenAlex | W2533309061 |
| Language | EN |
| References cited | 16 |
In a stylized model involving a developing country (called South) and a foreign patent-holder, we analyze whether and how the incidence and social value of compulsory licensing (CL) depends upon the South's patent protection policy. If South is free to deny patent protection, CL fails to arise in equilibrium and the option to use it makes both parties worse off. If South is obligated to offer patent protection, CL can occur and even yield a Pareto improvement. The ability to control price increases the South's incentive for patent protection as well as the likelihood of CL. This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved
Business · Economics · Law and economics · Perspective (graphical · Computer Science · Innovation Policy and RD · Intellectual Property and Patents · Pharmaceutical Economics and Policy
International patent protection
Pharmaceutical Price Controls and Entry Strategies
From Free Entry to Patent Protection
Compulsory licensing, price controls, and access to patented foreign products
Intellectual property rights, technology transfer and exports in developing countries
Intellectual property rights and innovation in developing countries
Patent Protection, Southern Innovation and Welfare in a North–South Trade Model
Market Power in the Global Economy
| Highly cited | No |
|---|