Market Power in the Global Economy
The Exhaustion and Protection of Intellectual Property
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 9717382 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Kamal Saggi (Vanderbilt University, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2013 |
| Volume | 123 |
| Issue | 567 |
| Pages | 131-161 |
| Publication date | 2013-03-01 |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | The Economic Journal (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0013-0133 • E-ISSN: 1468-0297 |
| Publisher | Oxford University Press (OUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1111/j.1468-0297.2012.02544.x |
| OpenAlex | W2237463602 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 2 |
| References cited | 17 |
We develop a North–South model in which a Northern monopolist can fully exercise its market power globally only if the North practises national exhaustion of intellectual property rights (IPR) and the South prohibits imitation. The firm's export incentive turns out to be a major determinant of equilibrium policy choices and their welfare effects. The North has a stronger preference for international exhaustion if the South forbids imitation, something the South is actually more willing to do under national exhaustion. Shutting down Southern imitation increases global welfare if and only if it is necessary for inducing the firm to export
Business · Consumer welfare · Economics · Imitation · Incentive · Intellectual property · International economics · International trade · Market economy · Market power · Microeconomics · Monopoly · Political science · Power (physics · Preference · Welfare · Global trade and economics · Intellectual Property and Patents · Law · Pharmaceutical Economics and Policy
| Citations per year | 0.25 |
|---|---|
| Citation span | 2018 - 2025 (8) |
| Highly cited | No |