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Noisy Introspection in the 11–20 Game

Bibliographic Data

ID9707757
AuthorsJacob K Goeree (0000-0001-9876-3425, UNSW Australia Business School, AGORA Center for Market Design, International Faculty University of Cologne), Philippos Louis (0000-0003-1316-4701, UNSW Australia Business School, AGORA Center for Market Design, corresponding author), Jingjing Zhang (0000-0003-0408-374X, UTS Business School)
Year2018
Volume128
Issue611
Pages1509-1530
Publication date2018-06-01
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueThe Economic Journal (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0013-0133 • E-ISSN: 1468-0297
PublisherOxford University Press (OUP) (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1111/ecoj.12479
OpenAlexW2585380055
LanguageEN
Citations received6
References cited13

Previous experiments based on the 11-20 game have produced evidence for the level-k model with observed levels of strategic thinking consistently ranging from 0 to 3. Our baseline treatment uses the 11-20 game and replicates previous results. We apply four models of strategic thinking to the baseline-treatment data and use these to predict behaviour and beliefs in five other treatments that employ games with a very similar structure. The best predictive performance is achieved by models that incorporate common knowledge of noise'. A model of noisy introspection, which does so, predicts behaviour remarkably well

Baseline (sea · Cognitive psychology · Image (mathematics · Introspection · Noise (video · Political science · Artificial Intelligence · Computer Science · Decision-Making and Behavioral Economics · Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies · Game Theory and Applications · Psychology

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Citations per year1.2
Citation span2021 - 2025 (5)
Highly citedNo

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