Jacob K Goeree
Biographic Data
| ID | 1130076 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Jacob K Goeree |
| GIVEN NAMES | Jacob K |
| FAMILY NAME | Goeree |
| SIGNATURE | GOEREE J K |
| AFFILIATIONS | California Institute of Technology |
| ORCID | 0000-0001-9876-3425 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 9 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 47 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 9 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 1998 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2018 |
| H-INDEX | 4 |
Noisy Introspection in the 11–20 Game
Previous experiments based on the 11-20 game have produced evidence for the level-k model with observed levels of strategic thinking consistently ranging from 0 to 3. Our baseline treatment uses the 11-20 game and replicates previous results. We apply four models of strategic thinking to the baseline-treatment data and use these to predict behaviour and beliefs in five other treatments that employ games with a very similar structure. The best pre…
Collusion in auctions for emission permits
Environmental markets have several institutional features that provide a new context for the use of auctions and that have not been studied previously. This paper reports on laboratory experiments testing three auction forms—uniform and discriminatory price sealed‐bid auctions and an ascending clock auction. We test the ability of subjects to tacitly or explicitly collude in order to maximize profits. Our main result is that the discriminatory an…
Optimal Privatisation using Qualifying Auctions
This article explores use of auctions for privatising public assets. In our model, a single 'insider' bidder possesses information about the asset's common value. Bidders are privately informed about their costs of exploiting the asset. Due to the insider's presence, uninformed bidders face a strong winner's curse in standard auctions. We show that the optimal mechanism discriminates against the informationally advantaged bidder. It can be implem…
In Search of Stars
How (Not) to Raise Money
We show that standard winner‐pay auctions are inept fund‐raising mechanisms because of the positive externality bidders forgo if they top another's high bid. Revenues are suppressed as a result and remain finite even when bidders value a dollar donated the same as a dollar kept. This problem does not occur in lotteries and all‐pay auctions, where bidders pay irrespective of whether they win. We introduce a general class of all‐pay auctions, rank …
An Explanation of Anomalous Behavior in Models of Political Participation
This paper characterizes behavior with "noisy" decision making for models of political interaction characterized by simultaneous binary decisions. Applications include: voting participation games, candidate entry, the volunteer's dilemma, and collective action problems with a contribution threshold. A simple graphical device is used to derive comparative statics and other theoretical properties of a "quantal response" equilibrium, and the resulti…
Competitive Bidding in Auctions with Private and Common Values
The objects for sale in most auctions possess both private and common value elements. This salient feature has not yet been incorporated into a strategic analysis of equilibrium bidding behaviour. This paper reports such an analysis for a stylised model in which bidders receive a private value signal and an independent common value signal. We show that more uncertainty about the common value has a negative effect on efficiency. Information provid…
Classroom Games
Economics is often taught at a level of abstraction that can hinder some students from gaining basic intuition. However, lecture and textbook presentations can be complemented with classroom exercises in which students make decisions and interact. The approach can increase interest in and decrease skepticism about economic theory. This feature offers short descriptions of classroom exercises for a variety of economics courses, with something of a…
Rent Seeking with Bounded Rationality
The winner‐take‐all nature of all‐pay auctions makes the outcome sensitive to decision errors, which we introduce with a logit formulation. The equilibrium bid distribution is a fixed point: the belief distributions that determine expected payoffs equal the choice distributions determined by expected payoffs. We prove existence, uniqueness, and symmetry properties. In contrast to the Nash equilibrium, the comparative statics of the logit equilibr…
How (Not) to Raise Money
We show that standard winner‐pay auctions are inept fund‐raising mechanisms because of the positive externality bidders forgo if they top another's high bid. Revenues are suppressed as a result and remain finite even when bidders value a dollar donated the same as a dollar kept. This problem does not occur in lotteries and all‐pay auctions, where bidders pay irrespective of whether they win. We introduce a general class of all‐pay auctions, rank …
An Explanation of Anomalous Behavior in Models of Political Participation
This paper characterizes behavior with "noisy" decision making for models of political interaction characterized by simultaneous binary decisions. Applications include: voting participation games, candidate entry, the volunteer's dilemma, and collective action problems with a contribution threshold. A simple graphical device is used to derive comparative statics and other theoretical properties of a "quantal response" equilibrium, and the resulti…
Rent Seeking with Bounded Rationality
The winner‐take‐all nature of all‐pay auctions makes the outcome sensitive to decision errors, which we introduce with a logit formulation. The equilibrium bid distribution is a fixed point: the belief distributions that determine expected payoffs equal the choice distributions determined by expected payoffs. We prove existence, uniqueness, and symmetry properties. In contrast to the Nash equilibrium, the comparative statics of the logit equilibr…
Collusion in auctions for emission permits
Environmental markets have several institutional features that provide a new context for the use of auctions and that have not been studied previously. This paper reports on laboratory experiments testing three auction forms—uniform and discriminatory price sealed‐bid auctions and an ascending clock auction. We test the ability of subjects to tacitly or explicitly collude in order to maximize profits. Our main result is that the discriminatory an…
Noisy Introspection in the 11–20 Game
Previous experiments based on the 11-20 game have produced evidence for the level-k model with observed levels of strategic thinking consistently ranging from 0 to 3. Our baseline treatment uses the 11-20 game and replicates previous results. We apply four models of strategic thinking to the baseline-treatment data and use these to predict behaviour and beliefs in five other treatments that employ games with a very similar structure. The best pre…
Competitive Bidding in Auctions with Private and Common Values
The objects for sale in most auctions possess both private and common value elements. This salient feature has not yet been incorporated into a strategic analysis of equilibrium bidding behaviour. This paper reports such an analysis for a stylised model in which bidders receive a private value signal and an independent common value signal. We show that more uncertainty about the common value has a negative effect on efficiency. Information provid…
Rent Seeking with Bounded Rationality
The winner‐take‐all nature of all‐pay auctions makes the outcome sensitive to decision errors, which we introduce with a logit formulation. The equilibrium bid distribution is a fixed point: the belief distributions that determine expected payoffs equal the choice distributions determined by expected payoffs. We prove existence, uniqueness, and symmetry properties. In contrast to the Nash equilibrium, the comparative statics of the logit equilibr…
Classroom Games
Economics is often taught at a level of abstraction that can hinder some students from gaining basic intuition. However, lecture and textbook presentations can be complemented with classroom exercises in which students make decisions and interact. The approach can increase interest in and decrease skepticism about economic theory. This feature offers short descriptions of classroom exercises for a variety of economics courses, with something of a…
Competitive Bidding in Auctions with Private and Common Values
The objects for sale in most auctions possess both private and common value elements. This salient feature has not yet been incorporated into a strategic analysis of equilibrium bidding behaviour. This paper reports such an analysis for a stylised model in which bidders receive a private value signal and an independent common value signal. We show that more uncertainty about the common value has a negative effect on efficiency. Information provid…
How (Not) to Raise Money
We show that standard winner‐pay auctions are inept fund‐raising mechanisms because of the positive externality bidders forgo if they top another's high bid. Revenues are suppressed as a result and remain finite even when bidders value a dollar donated the same as a dollar kept. This problem does not occur in lotteries and all‐pay auctions, where bidders pay irrespective of whether they win. We introduce a general class of all‐pay auctions, rank …
An Explanation of Anomalous Behavior in Models of Political Participation
This paper characterizes behavior with "noisy" decision making for models of political interaction characterized by simultaneous binary decisions. Applications include: voting participation games, candidate entry, the volunteer's dilemma, and collective action problems with a contribution threshold. A simple graphical device is used to derive comparative statics and other theoretical properties of a "quantal response" equilibrium, and the resulti…
In Search of Stars
Collusion in auctions for emission permits
Environmental markets have several institutional features that provide a new context for the use of auctions and that have not been studied previously. This paper reports on laboratory experiments testing three auction forms—uniform and discriminatory price sealed‐bid auctions and an ascending clock auction. We test the ability of subjects to tacitly or explicitly collude in order to maximize profits. Our main result is that the discriminatory an…
Optimal Privatisation using Qualifying Auctions
This article explores use of auctions for privatising public assets. In our model, a single 'insider' bidder possesses information about the asset's common value. Bidders are privately informed about their costs of exploiting the asset. Due to the insider's presence, uninformed bidders face a strong winner's curse in standard auctions. We show that the optimal mechanism discriminates against the informationally advantaged bidder. It can be implem…
Noisy Introspection in the 11–20 Game
Previous experiments based on the 11-20 game have produced evidence for the level-k model with observed levels of strategic thinking consistently ranging from 0 to 3. Our baseline treatment uses the 11-20 game and replicates previous results. We apply four models of strategic thinking to the baseline-treatment data and use these to predict behaviour and beliefs in five other treatments that employ games with a very similar structure. The best pre…
Economics (8 works) · Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies (8 works) · Microeconomics (8 works) · Computer Science (7 works) · Auction Theory and Applications (5 works) · Common value auction (5 works) · Artificial Intelligence (4 works) · Finance (4 works) · Mathematics (4 works) · Auction theory (3 works)