Optimal Privatisation using Qualifying Auctions
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 9712419 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Jan Boone (0000-0002-0958-2444, University of Tilburg, Tilec, CentER, ENCORE, UvA, IZA and CEPR), Jacob K Goeree (0000-0001-9876-3425, California Institute of Technology and CEPR) |
| Year | 2009 |
| Volume | 119 |
| Issue | 534 |
| Pages | 277-297 |
| Publication date | 2009-01-01 |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | The Economic Journal (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0013-0133 • E-ISSN: 1468-0297 |
| Publisher | Oxford University Press (OUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1111/j.1468-0297.2008.02213.x |
| OpenAlex | W2339605658 |
| Language | EN |
| References cited | 12 |
This article explores use of auctions for privatising public assets. In our model, a single 'insider' bidder possesses information about the asset's common value. Bidders are privately informed about their costs of exploiting the asset. Due to the insider's presence, uninformed bidders face a strong winner's curse in standard auctions. We show that the optimal mechanism discriminates against the informationally advantaged bidder. It can be implemented via a two-stage 'qualifying auction'. In the first stage, non-binding bids are submitted to determine who enters the second stage, which consists of a standard second-price auction augmented with a reserve price
Asset (computer security · Auction theory · Common value auction · Computer security · Curse · Dutch auction · Economics · English auction · Face value · Generalized second-price auction · Insider · Microeconomics · Revenue equivalence · Value (mathematics · Vickrey auction · Aging, Elder Care, and Social Issues · Computer Science · Finance · Health, Medicine and Society · Hermeneutics and Narrative Identity
| Highly cited | No |
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