How Pressure Groups Activate Voters and Move Candidates Closer to the Median
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 9707965 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Donald Wittman (0000-0002-1073-4345, University of California, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2009 |
| Volume | 119 |
| Issue | 540 |
| Pages | 1324-1343 |
| Publication date | 2009-10-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | The Economic Journal (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0013-0133 • E-ISSN: 1468-0297 |
| Publisher | Oxford University Press (OUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1111/j.1468-0297.2009.02273.x |
| OpenAlex | W2116011896 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 1 |
| References cited | 23 |
This article shows how uninformed but rational voters can respond intelligently to political advertising. The article models a situation where a candidate must rely on a pressure group for financing political advertising and making endorsements. The pressure group uses its power over the purse to influence the position chosen by the candidate. Nevertheless, when uninformed voters use a strategic rule of thumb, pressure-group contributions always move the outcome of the election closer to the median voter. By using such a rule of thumb, when there is advertising, uninformed voters can have the same influence on the election as informed voters. Copyright © The Author(s). Journal compilation © Royal Economic Society 2009
Advertising · Business · Economics · Microeconomics · Outcome (game theory · Political advertising · Political science · Politics · Position (finance · Power (physics · Rule of thumb · Computer Science · Electoral Systems and Political Participation · Finance · Law · Media Influence and Politics · Social Media and Politics
Elections with limited information
Perspectives on Public Choice
Interest groups, campaign contributions, and probabilistic voting
Shirking and sorting in a political market with finite-lived politicians
Asymmetric information and the electoral momentum of public opinion polls
Efficient use of reference group cues in a single dimension
Campaign finances and political platforms
Why Are American Presidential Election Campaign Polls So Variable When Votes Are So Predictable
Reexamining the "Minimal Effects" Model in Recent Presidential Campaigns
Campaign Advertising and Democratic Citizenship
Do Campaigns Help Voters Learn? A Cross-National Analysis
New Perspectives and Evidence on Political Communication and Campaign Effects
Electoral Competition with Informed and Uninformed Voters
Abstention in Elections with Asymmetric Information and Diverse Preferences
Shortcuts Versus Encyclopedias
An Information Rationale for the Power of Special Interests
| Unique citing works | 1 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0,1 |
| Citation span | 2016 - 2016 (1) |
| Citation velocity | historical |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 1 |