Insider--Outsider Theory and the Case for Implicit Contracts
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 9708053 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Derek Leslie (University of Manchester, corresponding author) |
| Year | 1992 |
| Volume | 102 |
| Issue | 410 |
| Pages | 37 |
| Publication date | 1992-01-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | The Economic Journal (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0013-0133 • E-ISSN: 1468-0297 |
| Publisher | Oxford University Press (OUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.2307/2234850 |
| OpenAlex | W2080669719 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 1 |
| References cited | 2 |
The purpose of this paper is to show that insider-outsider theory and implicit contracts are complementary rather than rival theories. Insider-outsider theory introduces some realistic institutional detail into implicit contracts, and insider-outsider theory is enriched by a more careful consideration of optimal wage contracts under conditions of uncertainty, which is the main comparative advantage of the implicit contract approach. The paper introduces a hybrid model and shows how the predictions of both approaches are modified. Copyright 1992 by Royal Economic Society
Business · Economics · Epistemology · Insider · Law and economics · Corporate Finance and Governance · Economic Theory and Policy · Merger and Competition Analysis · Philosophy
| Unique citing works | 1 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0,1 |
| Citation span | 2016 - 2016 (1) |
| Citation velocity | historical |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 1 |