Decision Times Reveal Private Information in Strategic Settings

Evidence from Bargaining Experiments

Bibliographic Data

ID9708385
AuthorsArkady Konovalov (0000-0002-9448-6659, The Ohio State University, USA, University of Zurich, Switzerland & University of Birmingham , UK), Ian Krajbich (0000-0001-6618-5675, The Ohio State University and University of California, Los Angeles , USA, corresponding author)
Year2023
Volume133
Issue656
Pages3007-3033
Publication date2023-10-06
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueThe Economic Journal (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0013-0133 • E-ISSN: 1468-0297
PublisherOxford University Press (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1093/ej/uead055
OpenAlexW4385234206
LanguageEN
Citations received1
References cited108

People respond quickly when they have a clear preference and slowly when they are close to indifference. The question is whether others exploit this tendency to infer private information. In two-stage bargaining experiments, we observe that the speed with which buyers reject sellers’ offers decreases with the size of the foregone surplus. This should allow sellers to infer buyers’ values from response times, creating an incentive for buyers to manipulate their response times. We experimentally identify distinct conditions under which subjects do, and do not, exhibit such strategic behaviour. These results provide the first insight into the possible use of response time as a strategic variable

Business · Economics · Exploit · Incentive · Microeconomics · Preference · Private information retrieval · Strategic interaction · Variable (mathematics · Auction Theory and Applications · Computer Science · Decision-Making and Behavioral Economics · Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies

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