A Prize to Give for

An Experiment on Public Good Funding Mechanisms

Bibliographic Data

ID9711011
AuthorsLuca Corazzini (0000-0002-0567-8457, University of Padua and Bocconi University), Marco Faravelli (0000-0001-9646-9126, University of St Andrews), Luca Stanca (0000-0003-2149-5658, University of Milan Bicocca)
Year2010
Volume120
Issue547
Pages944-967
Publication date2010-09-01
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueThe Economic Journal (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0013-0133 • E-ISSN: 1468-0297
PublisherOxford University Press (OUP) (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1111/j.1468-0297.2009.02314.x
OpenAlexW1486525031
LanguageEN
Citations received2
References cited18

This article investigates fund-raising mechanisms based on a prize as a way to overcome free riding in the private provision of public goods. We focus on an environment characterised by income heterogeneity and incomplete information about income levels. Our analysis compares experimentally the performance of a lottery, an all-pay auction and a benchmark voluntary contribution mechanism. We find that prize-based mechanisms perform better than voluntary contribution in terms of public good provision. Contrary to the theoretical predictions, contributions are significantly higher in the lottery than in the all-pay auction, both overall and by individual income types

Benchmark (surveying · Economics · Focus (optics · Free riding · Incentive · Lottery · Mechanism (biology · Microeconomics · Private information retrieval · Public economics · Public good · Auction Theory and Applications · Computer Science · Economic Policies and Impacts · Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies

Tools

Open DOISci-HubOpen Access