Procedural Rationality and Equilibrium Trust
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 9712204 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Robert Rowthorn (University of Cambridge Barnard College, Columbia University), Rajiv Sethi (0000-0003-2631-5644, University of Cambridge Barnard College, Columbia University) |
| Year | 2008 |
| Volume | 118 |
| Issue | 530 |
| Pages | 889-905 |
| Publication date | 2008-07-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | The Economic Journal (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0013-0133 • E-ISSN: 1468-0297 |
| Publisher | Oxford University Press (OUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1111/j.1468-0297.2008.02154.x |
| OpenAlex | W2008880232 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 1 |
| References cited | 10 |
This article examines the determinants of steady state trust in a population of principals and agents, where the former learn from experience using boundedly rational procedures. For any distribution of agent types, the long-run distribution of principal behaviour is characterised. Heterogeneity in the behaviour of principals persists under both the sampling procedure ( Osborne and Rubinstein, 1998 ) and the maximum average procedure ( Rustichini, 2003 ). Despite its greater sophistication, the maximum average procedure can result in poorer performance than the sampling procedure, both from the perspective of the principal and also with respect to aggregate payoffs. Copyright © The Author(s). Journal compilation © Royal Economic Society 2008
Distribution (mathematics · Econometrics · Economics · Mathematical economics · Microeconomics · Perspective (graphical · Political science · Population · Principal (computer security · Rationality · Sampling (signal processing · Sociology · Sophistication · Auction Theory and Applications · Computer Science · Economic Policies and Impacts · Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies · Law · Mathematics
| Unique citing works | 1 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0,06 |
| Citation span | 2009 - 2009 (1) |
| Citation velocity | historical |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 1 |