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Demand Reduction in Multi‐Object Auctions with Resale

An Experimental Analysis

Bibliographic Data

ID9714686
AuthorsMarco Pagnozzi (Università di Napoli Federico II), Krista J Saral (0000-0002-5470-0972, Webster University Geneva)
Year2017
Volume127
Issue607
Pages2702-2729
Publication date2017-12-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueThe Economic Journal (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0013-0133 • E-ISSN: 1468-0297
PublisherOxford University Press (OUP) (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1111/ecoj.12392
OpenAlexW1845859347
LanguageEN
References cited36

We analyse the effects of different resale mechanisms on bidders’ strategies in multi‐object uniform‐price auctions with asymmetric bidders. Our experiment consists of four treatments: one without resale and three resale treatments that vary the information available and the bargaining mechanism in the resale market. Resale markets induce demand reduction by high‐value bidders and speculation by low‐value bidders, thus affecting the allocation of the objects on sale. The magnitude of these effects, however, depends on the structure of the resale market. Features of the resale market that tend to increase its efficiency result in lower auction efficiency and seller's revenue

Business · Common value auction · Demand reduction · Economics · Industrial organization · Microeconomics · Object (grammar · Reduction (mathematics · Revenue · Speculation · Value (mathematics · Auction Theory and Applications · Computer Science · Consumer Market Behavior and Pricing · Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies · Finance

  • Bargaining Experiments

    Alvin E Roth•Handbook of Experimental Economics•1995

  • Z-Tree

    Open Access•Urs Fischbacher•Experimental Economics•2007

  • Bidding Behaviour in Multi‐Unit Auctions – an Experimental Investigation

    Open Access•Dirk Engelmann, Veronika Grimm•The Economic Journal•2009

Citation velocityhistorical
Highly citedNo

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