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Bidding Behaviour in Multi‐Unit Auctions – an Experimental Investigation

Bibliographic Data

ID9720679
AuthorsDirk Engelmann (Royal Holloway, University of London, Centre for Experimental Economics at the University of Copenhagen and Economics Institute of the Academy of Sciences of the Czech Republic), Veronika Grimm (0000-0002-9759-4807, University of Erlangen‐Nuremberg and University of Cologne)
Year2009
Volume119
Issue537
Pages855-882
Publication date2009-04-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueThe Economic Journal (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0013-0133 • E-ISSN: 1468-0297
PublisherOxford University Press (OUP) (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1111/j.1468-0297.2009.02249.x
OpenAlexW2095004689
LanguageEN
Citations received2
References cited32

We present laboratory experiments of five different multi-unit auction mechanisms. Two units of a homogeneous object were auctioned off among two bidders with flat demand for two units. We test whether expected demand reduction occurs in open and sealed-bid uniform-price auctions. We also test revenue equivalence for these auctions as well as for the Ausubel, the Vickrey and the discriminatory sealed-bid auction. Furthermore, we compare the five mechanisms with respect to the efficient allocation of the units. Copyright © The Author(s). Journal compilation © Royal Economic Society 2009

Bidding · Common value auction · Czech · Economics · Library science · Linguistics · Management · Mathematics education · Microeconomics · Political science · Sociology · Unit (ring theory · Auction Theory and Applications · Computer Science · Consumer Market Behavior and Pricing · Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies · Philosophy · Psychology

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Unique citing works2
Citations per year0,22
Citation span2017 - 2019 (3)
Citation velocityhistorical
Highly citedNo
Citation typesNeutral: 2

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