Opportunities as Chances

Maximising the Probability that Everybody Succeeds

Datos Bibliográficos

ID9715237
AutoresMarco Mariotti (0000-0002-5308-5154, Queen Mary University of London), Roberto Veneziani (0000-0001-6431-0145, Queen Mary University of London)
Año2018
Volumen128
Número611
Páginas1609-1633
Fecha de publicación2018-06-01
Peer ReviewedSí
Open AccessSí
TipoARTICLE
RevistaThe Economic Journal (JOURNAL)
Identificadores de la revistaISSN: 0013-0133 • E-ISSN: 1468-0297
EditorialOxford University Press (OUP) (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1111/ecoj.12467
OpenAlexW1926351148
IdiomaEN
Citas recibidas6
Referencias citadas37

Opportunities in society are commonly interpreted as `chances of success'. Within this interpretation, should opportunities be equalised? We show that a liberal principle of justice and a limited principle of social rationality imply that opportunity profiles should be evaluated by means of a `Nash' criterion. The interpretation is new: the social objective should be to maximise the chance that everybody in society succeeds. In particular, the failure of even only one individual must be considered maximally detrimental. We also study a refinement of this criterion and its extension to problems of intergenerational justice

Economic Justice · Economics · Extension (predicate logic · Law and economics · Market economy · Mathematical economics · Microeconomics · Political science · Positive economics · Public economics · Rationality · Social choice theory · Social justice · Social Welfare · Welfare · Computer Science · Decision-Making and Behavioral Economics · Game Theory and Voting Systems · Income, Poverty, and Inequality · Law