Smarter Task Assignment or Greater Effort

The Impact of Incentives on Team Performance

Bibliographic Data

ID9716720
AuthorsStephen Burge (0000-0001-7206-3674, Université Paris Dauphine-PSL), Simon Burgess (University of Bristol, CMPO and CEPR University of Bristol, CMPO, Imperial College and CEPR Université Paris‐ Dauphine, LEDa‐SDFi CMPO University College London), Carol Propper (0000-0002-8257-431X, University of Bristol, CMPO and CEPR University of Bristol, CMPO, Imperial College and CEPR Université Paris‐ Dauphine, LEDa‐SDFi CMPO University College London), Marisa Ratto (0000-0003-4521-2448, University of Bristol, CMPO and CEPR University of Bristol, CMPO, Imperial College and CEPR Université Paris‐ Dauphine, LEDa‐SDFi CMPO University College London), Stephanie Von Hinke Kessler Scholder (University of Bristol, CMPO and CEPR University of Bristol, CMPO, Imperial College and CEPR Université Paris‐ Dauphine, LEDa‐SDFi CMPO University College London), Stephanie Von Hinke (0000-0002-8272-076X, Université Paris Dauphine-PSL), Emma Tominey (University of Bristol, CMPO and CEPR University of Bristol, CMPO, Imperial College and CEPR Université Paris‐ Dauphine, LEDa‐SDFi CMPO University College London)
Year2010
Volume120
Issue547
Pages968-989
Publication date2010-09-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueThe Economic Journal (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0013-0133 • E-ISSN: 1468-0297
PublisherOxford University Press (OUP) (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1111/j.1468-0297.2009.02331.x
OpenAlexW2170130409
LanguageEN
Citations received12
References cited12

We use an experiment to study the impact of team-based incentives, exploiting rich data from personnel records and management information systems. Using a triple difference design, we show that the incentive scheme had an impact on team performance, even with quite large teams. We examine whether this effect was due to increased effort from workers or strategic task reallocation. We find that the provision of financial incentives did raise individual performance but that managers also disproportionately reallocated efficient workers to the incentivised tasks. We show that this reallocation was the more important contributor to the overall outcome. Copyright © The Author(s). Journal compilation © Royal Economic Society 2009

Economics · Incentive · Media studies · Political science · Schools of economic thought · Sociology · Auction Theory and Applications · Classics · Economic Policies and Impacts · Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies · History

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