Tying and Innovation
A Dynamic Analysis of Tying Arrangements
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 9717462 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Jay Pil Choi (0000-0001-6039-5081, Michigan State University, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2004 |
| Volume | 114 |
| Issue | 492 |
| Pages | 83-101 |
| Publication date | 2004-01-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | The Economic Journal (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0013-0133 • E-ISSN: 1468-0297 |
| Publisher | Oxford University Press (OUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1046/j.0013-0133.2003.00178.x |
| OpenAlex | W3124176425 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 2 |
| References cited | 18 |
This paper analyzes the effects of tying arrangements on R&D incentives. It shows that tying is a means through which a firm can commit to more aggressive R&D investment in the tied goods market. Tying also has the strategic effect of reducing rivals' incentives to invest in R&D. The strategy of tying is a profitable one if the gains, via an increased share of dynamic rents in the tied goods market, exceed the losses that result from intensified price competition in the market. The welfare implications of tying, and consequently the appropriate antitrust policy, are shown to depend on the nature of R&D competition
Business · Commit · Competition (biology · Economic rent · Economics · Incentive · Industrial organization · Market economy · Microeconomics · Tying · Welfare · Digital Platforms and Economics · Global trade and economics · Merger and Competition Analysis
| Unique citing works | 2 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0,14 |
| Citation span | 2012 - 2020 (9) |
| Citation velocity | historical |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 2 |