Fool Me Once

An Experiment on Credibility and Leadership

Datos Bibliográficos

ID9718080
AutoresDavid J Cooper (0000-0003-3391-3538, Florida State University and University of East Anglia, autor de correspondencia), John R Hamman (Florida State University), John Hamman (0000-0003-4809-159X, Florida State University), Roberto A Weber (0000-0001-8133-8131, University of Zurich)
Año2020
Volumen130
Número631
Páginas2105-2133
Fecha de publicación2020-10-16
Peer ReviewedSí
Open AccessSí
TipoARTICLE
RevistaThe Economic Journal (JOURNAL)
Identificadores de la revistaISSN: 0013-0133 • E-ISSN: 1468-0297
EditorialOxford University Press (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1093/ej/ueaa059
OpenAlexW3121556846
IdiomaEN
Citas recibidas7
Referencias citadas36

We investigate ‘social credibility’, a leader’s ability to convince followers that conditions are favourable and that others will follow the leader's advice. To do so, we study an experimental joint venture with three key properties: returns are uncertain, investments are complements, and investment is often more beneficial for the leader than the followers. The leader has private information about investment returns and can facilitate coordination through cheap-talk recommendations. We find that leaders manage social credibility by forgoing potentially profitable advice to invest, increasing the likelihood that subsequent recommendations are followed. We identify factors that affect the persistence of social credibility

Advice (programming · Affect (linguistics · Business · Cheap talk · Commerce · Credibility · Economics · Investment (military · Joint venture · Key (lock · Microeconomics · Political science · Source credibility · Culture, Economy, and Development Studies · Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies · Game Theory and Applications · Marketing · Psychology