The Need for Enemies
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 9718869 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Leopoldo Fergusson (0000-0002-1041-3760, Universidad de los Andes), James A Robinson (0000-0002-2635-4590), Ragnar Torvik (Norwegian University of Science and Technology), Juan F Vargas (0000-0001-8090-8091, Universidad del Rosario) |
| Year | 2016 |
| Volume | 126 |
| Issue | 593 |
| Pages | 1018-1054 |
| Publication date | 2016-06-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | The Economic Journal (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0013-0133 • E-ISSN: 1468-0297 |
| Publisher | Oxford University Press (OUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1111/ecoj.12174 |
| OpenAlex | W2101937001 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 15 |
| References cited | 22 |
We develop a model where some politicians have an edge in undertaking a task and this gives them electoral advantage, creating an incentive to underperform in the task. We test the empirical implications in the context of fighting against insurgents, using Colombian data. The main prediction is that large defeats for the insurgents reduce the probability that these politicians fight them, especially in electorally salient places. We find that after the largest victories against FARC rebels, the government reduced its counterinsurgency efforts, especially in politically important municipalities. Politicians need to keep enemies alive in order to maintain their political advantage. © 2014 Royal Economic Society
Business · Context (archaeology · Economics · Geography · Government (linguistics · Incentive · Management · Microeconomics · Order (exchange · Political economy · Political science · Politics · Salient · Task (project management · Crime, Illicit Activities, and Governance · Finance · History and Politics in Latin America · Law · Political Conflict and Governance
Do conservative central bankers weaken the chances of conservative politicians
Is Murder Bad for Business? Evidence from Colombia
Political Influence on Homicide Reports under Civil Conflict
Elecciones presidenciales y desarrollo municipal
Legacies of Political Violence and Voter Behavior in Colombia
Fiscal weakness, the (under-) provision of public services, and institutional reform
Transnational insurgents
Political Competition and State Capacity
The role of innovative entrepreneurship within Colombian business cycle scenarios
The Weak State Trap
Strategic Violence during Democratization
Competition and Civilian Victimization
Ripe for better post-war governance? The impact of the 2016 peace agreement on the reestablishment of health services in Colombia
The politics of nonviolent mobilization
Endogenous Taxation in Ongoing Internal Conflict
Party Control of State Government and the Distribution of Public Expenditures
White elephants
Electoral Competition and Special Interest Politics
The Monopoly of Violence
How Much Should We Trust Differences-In-Differences Estimates?
The Need for Enemies
The Farc
A Theory of Political Entrenchment
I Hate You Just the Way You Are
The Art of Coercion
Balanced-budget redistribution as the outcome of political competition
Economic Shocks and Civil Conflict
The Need to Have Enemies and Allies
Do People Need Foreign Enemies
Democracy against Parties? Party System Deinstitutionalization in Colombia
Electoral Competition with Informed and Uninformed Voters
| Unique citing works | 15 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 1,5 |
| Citation span | 2016 - 2024 (9) |
| Citation velocity | recent |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 15 |