Labour Markets in Professional Sports

Datos Bibliográficos

ID9720086
AutoresSherwin Rosen (University of Chicago), Allen R Sanderson (University of Chicago), Allen Sanderson (University of Chicago)
Año2001
Volumen111
Número469
PáginasF47-F68
Fecha de publicación2001-02-01
Peer ReviewedSí
Open AccessSí
TipoARTICLE
RevistaThe Economic Journal (JOURNAL)
Identificadores de la revistaISSN: 0013-0133 • E-ISSN: 1468-0297
EditorialOxford University Press (OUP) (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1111/1468-0297.00598
OpenAlexW3125207837
IdiomaEN
Citas recibidas20
Referencias citadas11

Important elements of supply and demand are starkly observable in professional athletics. Demand affects how pay varies with personal productivity, racial discrimination, the nature of factor substitutions, and player mobility. Property rights affect the supply of athletic talent, arms races and incentives to restrict competition. In sports, excess incentives to win can create negative externalities. Collective agreements such as reverse‐order drafts, payroll caps and revenue sharing constrain these forces, but redistribute rents from talented players to owners because they punish success. The European approach–promoting better‐performing teams and relegating those with the poorest records–punish failure

Business · Competition (biology · Economic rent · Economics · Externality · Incentive · Labour economics · Market economy · Microeconomics · Order (exchange · Payroll · Productivity · Property rights · Revenue · Supply and demand · Finance · Sport and Mega-Event Impacts · Sports Analytics and Performance · Sports, Gender, and Society